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Widening wage dispersion raises the question how public policy should pro-
tect the living standards of unskilled workers, as policy makers are increas-
ingly concerned about the adverse incentive e¤ects of generous income sup-
port. In response to these concerns, many countries have cut taxes on un-
skilled work in order to combat poverty while at the same time encouraging
unskilled workers to look for work. Both the United States and several Euro-
pean countries have already introduced or are considering in-work tax bene-
…ts for unskilled work in the form of an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
These tax policies are part of active labor-market policies and ’welfare-to-
work’ programs, where governments …ght poverty by raising employment of
unskilled workers.
To investigate the optimal response of tax policy to income support pro-
vided through the welfare system and to declining relative wages of unskilled
labor, we extend the standard model of optimal non-linear income taxation
developed by Mirrlees (1971). In particular, we incorporate the labor-market
imperfections that induce governments to provide income support, namely
search costs and involuntary unemployment.
In the presence of a search margin, the government has to account for
not only the standard incentive compatibility constraint on work e¤ort, but
also a participation constraint on the willingness of low-skilled agents to
look for work. Indeed, from an analytical point of view, our main con-
tribution is to add a participation constraint to the optimal tax problem,
including the decision regarding which types should optimally participate in
job search. In doing so, we extend both the optimal tax literature, which
typically abstracts from participation constraints, and the literature on op-
timal non-linear monopoly pricing, which generally assumes that the lowest
participating type is exogenously given. Within a non-linear pricing frame-
work, Rochet and Stole (2002) recently added an endogenous participation
constraint by allowing agents to di¤er in both outside options and prefer-
ences for quality. Our analysis deviates from that of Rochet and Stole (2002)
in two respects. First, in the non-linear pricing problem explored in Ro-
chet and Stole (2002), the monopolist cares only about pro…ts earned on the
participating agents. In our optimal tax problem, in contrast, also agents
who do not participate appear in the objective function because the govern-
ment is interested in the utilities of both participating and nonparticipating
types. The second di¤erence with Rochet and Stole (2002) is that we allow
agents to di¤er in only one dimension; agents feature di¤erent skill levels
but exhibit the same search costs. Within the context of our labor-market
application, this is a reasonable assumption, which is in fact employed by
2most of the labor-market literature on search (see, for instance, Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999)). This assumption implies that the participation con-
straint is binding only at the bottom of the skill distribution. Rochet and
Stole (2002), in contrast, derive a binding participation constraint for each
type.
The literature on optimal income taxation has modelled unemployment
of unskilled agents as these agents reducing the hours they work in their
jobs when they face low gross wages and rapidly rising marginal tax rates.
Accordingly, lowproductivity workers are bunched inlow- or zero-production
jobs. By introducing a participation margin and positive search costs, we
introduce another type of bunching at the bottom of the skill distribution:
unskilled agents do not search for work and thus drop out of the labor force.
Heckman (1993), for instance, stressed that ’a crucial theoretical distinction
with important empirical pay o¤ is that between labor supply choices at the
extensive margin ( ...) and choices at the intensive margin’. Empirical work
does in fact reveal that unskilled workers adjust their laborsupply inresponse
to tax and bene…t programs on mainly the extensive margin (i.e. leaving the
labor force altogether, for example through early retirement) rather than
the intensive margin (i.e. reducing the hours they work in their jobs) (see,
e.g. Eissa and Liebman (1996), Kimmel and Kniesners (1998), Blundell
(2001), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and Meyer (2002)). This explains
the policy concern about welfare programs and high taxes on unskilled work
discouraging low-income earners from looking for work. Indeed, our model
is consistent with the stylized fact that low-skilled agents feature the highest
long-term unemployment rates (see OECD (2001)).
Also Saez (2002) incorporates the two labor-supply margins of not only
hours worked but also labor-force participation in an optimal income tax
model.1 Our approach di¤ers from that of Saez in three important respects.
First of all, whereas Saez assumes that all unemployed have voluntarily left
the labor force, we account also for involuntary unemployment. Agents
thus face two risks: being born with low ability and being involuntarily
unemployed. More generally, we are more explicit than Saez (2002) about
the labor-market imperfections a¤ecting the costs and e¤ectiveness of labor-
market search, including the welfare implications of these imperfections.
Our analysis di¤ers from Saez (2002) also in that the government takes
the welfare bene…t as exogenously given when optimizing the tax system.
1Diamond (1980) and Choné and Laroque (2002) incorporate a participation margin in
an optimal tax framework in which work e¤ort is exogenous so that the intensive margin
is absent. Our paper is similar to Saez (2002) in that we model both the intensive and
extensive margins of labor supply, allowing us to explore the interaction between these
two labor-supply margins.
3Hence, the governmentcanemploy only the non-linear incometax tooptimize
social welfare. Indeed, in practice, taxes and social assistance are often set
by distinct agencies based on rather di¤erent interests and considerations.
In some federal countries, for example, local governments determine social
assistance bene…ts while the central government is mainly responsible for the
tax system. One can also interpret the minimum income ‡oor set by social
assistance bene…ts as being determined by considerations outside our model.
Alternatively, one can view our analysis as exploring how the tax system can
be employed to address the possibly sub-optimal aspects of social assistance.
A …nal di¤erence is that Saez (2002) allows for more general preferences
that are not necessarily quasi-linear in leisure. Whereas his results are thus
more general than ours,2 our speci…c assumptions on preferences allow for
more analytical results on comparative statics with respect to public spend-
ing, labor-market imperfections (such as the costs and e¤ectiveness of search)
and institutional features of the welfare system. This sheds additional light
on the determinants of the optimal tax schedule. Indeed, a substantial litera-
ture (see, e.g., Boadway, Cu¤ and Marchand (2000), Ebert (1992), Weymark
(1986, 1987), and Lollivier and Rochet (1983)) has turned to quasi-linear
preferences in leisure in order to obtain more intuition for the determinants
of the optimal non-linear income tax, as these preferences allow for closed-
form solutions of the standard optimal non-linear income tax problem. Our
quasi-linear preferences also imply that a utilitarian government cares about
the distribution of consumption rather than the distribution of work e¤ort.
Indeed, policy debates typically focus on raising consumption rather than
reducing work e¤ort of the poor. We extend the literature on optimal non-
linear income taxationwith quasi-linear preferences in four ways; we allow for
involuntary unemployment, a participation (or search) constraint, an exoge-
nous welfare bene…t, and anon-utilitariansocial welfare function. These four
extensions make this literature more relevant for addressing the timely policy
question of how the optimal tax system should treat low-skilled employment
inthe face of income support. The participation margin also eliminates some
of the unrealistic implications of a model with quasi-linear preferences for ag-
gregate labor supply elasticities. Hence, the introduction of a participation
margin is particularly important inthecontextof this particular model. More
generally, the participation margin gives rise to more intuitive comparative
statics. In particular, in a traditional model without a participation margin,
2Lemma 21 in the appendix shows that a more general version of our model based
on homogeneous preferences and an explicit social welfare function yields in fact similar
results for optimal marginal tax rates as found by Saez (2002), who assumes heterogeneous
preferences and leaves implicit the underlying social welfare function in the presence of
these heterogeneous preferences.
4higher welfare bene…ts reduce unemployment. Ina model with abindingpar-
ticipation margin, in contrast, higher welfare bene…ts raise unemployment,
as it becomes more expensive to draw these types into the labor force.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. After section 2 introduces
the model, section 3 sets out the optimal tax problem. Section 4 investigates
the case without a binding participation constraint. This section generalizes
results in Ebert (1992) and Boadway, Cu¤, and Marchand (2000) to the case
of a non-utilitarian government. Since we are especially interested in the
optimal taxationof lowearnings, we discuss two reasons why the least skilled
workers may be bunchedin the absence of a participation margin. These two
types of bunching provide important benchmarks for bunching on account of
aparticipation margin. Weelaborateinparticularonthecase inwhichagents
stop working on the intensive rather than extensive margin by reducing their
work e¤ort to zero. By showing that this implies rather peculiar comparative
statics, we motivate the introduction of a participation margin in section
5. Those readers who do not need this motivation and are not interested
in how our paper is linked to the traditional optimal tax literature in the
presence of quasi-linear preferences can skip section 4. In exploring the
consequences of a binding participation margin, section 5 discusses, among
other things, how labor-market imperfections and the features of the welfare
system impact the optimal income tax. Numerical simulations in section 6
illustrate the quantitative importance of the participation margin. Finally,
section 7 concludes.
2 The model
The economy is populated with agents featuring homogenous preferences
but heterogeneous skills. A worker of ability (or skill or e¢ciency level) n
working y hours (or providing y units of work e¤ort) supplies ny e¢ciency
units of homogeneous labor. With constant unitary labor productivity, these
e¢ciency units are transformed in the same number of units of output. We
select output as the numeraire. The before-tax wage per hour is thus given
by exogenous skill n: Hence, overall gross output produced by a worker of
skill n, z(n); amounts to z(n) = ny(n): Since workers collect only labor
income, this gross output z(n) corresponds tothe gross (i.e. before-tax) labor
income earned by a worker of that skill n: The density of agents of ability
n is denoted by f(n); and F(n) represents the corresponding cumulative
distribution function. The support of the distribution of abilities is given by
5[n0;n1];3 while f (:) is di¤erentiable and satis…es 1¡ n0f (n0) > 0.
Workers sharethe followingquasi-linearutility function overconsumption
x and hours worked (or work e¤ort) y
u(x;y) = v(x) ¡ y;
where v(x) is increasing and strictly concave: v0(x) > 0;v00(x) < 0 for all
x ¸ 0.4 Furthermore, v(0) = 0; limx#0v0(x) = 1, limx¡!+1v0(x) = 0 and
limx!+1v(x)¡xv0 (x) = +1. The concavity of v(:) implies that agents are
risk averse and thus want to obtain insurance against the risks of involuntary
unemployment and a low earning capacity n. The speci…c cardinalization
of the utility function a¤ects the distributional preferences of a utilitarian
government. In particular, the concavity of v(:) implies that a utilitarian
government aims to …ght poverty. In other words, such a government wants
to insure agents against the risk of a low consumption level.
As in Lollivier and Rochet (1983), Weymark (1987), Ebert (1992), and
Boadway, Cu¤ and Marchand (2000), utility is linear in work e¤ort y and
separable in work e¤ort and consumption x. This has four important con-
sequences. First, consumption x is not a¤ected by income e¤ects. A higher
average tax rate thus induces households to raise work e¤ort y rather than
to cut consumption x. Second, the single-crossing (or sorting) property is
met, implying that the incentive compatibility constraints can be replaced by
(much simpler) monotonicity conditions on x(:) and z (:) (see, for instance,
FudenbergandTirole (1991)). Third, the speci…c quasi-linear utility function
allows for a closed-form solution ofthe standard optimal incometax problem.
Fourth, a utilitarian government cares only about aggregate work e¤ort in
the economy. Such a government thus aims at an equal distribution of con-
sumption (i.e. the alleviation of poverty) rather than an equal distribution
of work e¤ort over the various agents. Indeed, Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala
(1994) observe that policy debates focus on raising consumption rather than
reducing work e¤ort (or increasing leisure) of the poor. However, whereas
3The …nite upper bound of the skill distribution n1 implies that the optimal marginal
tax rate is zero at the top of the income distribution (see Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977)).
Diamond (1998) considers various unbouded distributions, including the Pareto distribu-
tion for skills above the mode. We focus on the bottom rather than the top of the skill
distribution and therefore do not extensively consider the sensitivity of our results with
respect to the distribution of skills at the top of the skill distribution.
4Lemma 21 (at the end of the appendix) characterizes the optimal marginal tax rates
for a more general utility function u (x;y) = v (x)¡c(y) and a more general convex search
function ￿(s) (see below). This model facilitates comparison with the framework used
by Saez (2002) and implies more degrees of freedom to calibrate the model on the basis
of estimated labor-supply elasticities. However, this model does not allow for analytical
results on the comparative statics exercises we do below.
6Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala (1994) adopt a non-welfarist social welfare func-
tion to do justice to this policy concern of …ghting poverty, we continue in
the welfarist tradition but assume a special, quasi-linear utility function.
In line with the optimal income tax literature, the government is assumed
not to be able to observe skills n but to know the distribution function f(n)
and before-tax income of each individual z(n): We depart from the standard
optimal tax literature by incorporating non-veri…able jobsearch: agents have
to search for a job and the government cannot verify search intensities. In
particular, we allow agents to adjust their labor supply on not only the
intensivemargin (i.e. by varying hours ofwork) but alsothe extensive margin
(i.e. by deciding whether or not to look for a job). In particular, by searching
with intensity s 2 [0;1]; agents …nd a job with probability s. Search costs
￿(s) are given by
￿(s) =
½
￿s if s 2 [0; ¹ s]
+1 otherwise,
where ￿ ¸ 0 is a parameter representing the magnitude of the search costs.
¹ s < 1 captures the idea that agents can fail to …nd a job, even if they
search at full capacity ¹ s. By modelling the costs and e¤ectiveness of search,
the parameters ￿ and (1¡ ¹ s) represent labor-market imperfections that give
rise to unemployment. Agents thus di¤er in both ability n and employment
status and face two types of risks: being born with low ability n and being
involuntarily unemployed.
If an agent does not succeed in …nding a job, (s)he receives a welfare
(or social assistance) bene…t b ¸ 0.5 Since the government cannot observe
the abilities and search intensities of unemployed agents,6 the welfare bene…t
does not depend on n and is exogenously given to the agent. An agent of
ability n thus selects search intensity s to maximize expected utility
U(n) = max
s f¡￿(s)+ su(n)+ (1¡ s)v(b)g:
Substitutinginthesearchcost function ￿ (s) introduced above, one caneasily
5An alternative interpretation of b is a categorial unemployment insurance bene…t.
Indeed, the bene…t is paid only to those who have not found a job. In most countries,
however, unemployment bene…ts depend on the previously earned wage incomes and are
thus likely to increase with ability n: This is the main reason why we interpret b as a social
assistance payment, i.e. the minimum income level provided by the government. Another
interpretation of b is an early retirement or disability bene…t that is paid if an agent does
not have a job.
6The government, however, can observe whether or not an agent has found a job.
Hence, we do not require that b = ~ T(0), where ~ T(z) is the tax schedule as a function of
gross income.
7verify that the optimal choice of s for type n amounts to
s(n) =
½
0 if u(n) < ￿ + v(b)
¹ s if u(n) ¸ ￿ +v(b):
(1)
The linear speci…cation of the search cost function thus implies that a worker
either does not searchat all andis voluntarily unemployedor that he searches
at the level ¹ s (and faces a probability of (1 ¡ ¹ s) of involuntary unemploy-
ment). We refer to the constraint u(n) ¸ ￿ + v(b) as the participation or
individual rationality constraint. The government has to respect this par-
ticipation constraint because it cannot observe search. A special case of our
model is a regular labor supply model with …xed costs of work, e.g. child
care costs. In particular, without involuntary unemployment (i.e. ¹ s = 1),
the parameter ￿ can be interpreted as these …xed costs of entering the labor
market. Indeed, an agent enters the labor market by actively looking for a
job only if the additional pay-o¤ from work, u(n) ¡ v(b); exceeds the …xed
entry cost ￿: Positive entry cost introduce a di¤erence between stopping to
work on the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply: working zero
hours in a job (i.e. responding on the intensive margin) is di¤erent from
staying outside the labor force by not looking for a job (i.e. responding on
the extensive margin).
After a worker has found a job, (s)he has to determine her work e¤ort.
Instead of working withwork e¤ort y(n) and consumption x(n) as the instru-
ments of the worker, we write the utility function in terms of gross income
(or output) z(n) ´ ny(n) and net income (or consumption) x(n): Utility of
type n is then written as u(n) ´ v(x(n)) ¡ z(n)=n: The ex-post utility of a














where ~ T (z) denotes the tax schedule as a function of gross income z. We can
write T (n) = ~ T (z (n)) since typen chooses gross income z(n) inequilibrium.




The following lemma shows that the second-order condition for the agents’
optimal choice of consumption and gross income implies that consumption
andgross income are non-decreasing in type n. The inequalities in the lemma
are therefore called the second-order incentive compatibility constraints.
8Lemma 1 The second-order condition for individual optimization issatis…ed
if and only if
z0(n) ¸ 0; (4)
x
0(n) ¸ 0;
while z0(n) = 0 if and only if x0 (n) = 0.
As alastconstraintonindividual optimization, labor supply andtherefore
before-tax income should be non-negative:
z(n) ¸ 0: (5)
The government maximizes ex-ante expected utility (i.e. expected utility




[¡￿s(n) +s(n)u(n) + (1¡ s(n))v(b)]f(n)`(n)dn:
We normalize the rank-order weights `(n) such that
R n1
n0 f(n)`(n) = 1; and
assume `
0(n) · 0.7 The government is utilitarian if the rank-order weights
are constant, i.e. `(n) = 1 for all n: This is the usual assumption adopted
in the literature on optimal non-linear income taxation in the presence of
preferences that are quasi-linear in leisure (see Lollivier and Rochet (1983),
Weymark (1987), Ebert (1992), and Boadway, Cu¤, and Marchand (2000)8).
If the welfare weights are declining (i.e. `
0(n) < 0); the government is con-
cerned about the distribution of not only consumption but also leisure (or
work e¤ort).
The government has to respect the following budget constraint
Z n1
n0
f (n)s(n)[b+ T (n)]dn = E + b; (6)
where E represents exogenously given exhaustive government expenditure,
and T (n) ´ z (n) ¡ x(n) denotes the tax paid by type n: The government
can employ only the non-linear income tax to optimize social welfare and
takes public spending E and the welfare bene…t as given.
7The rank-order weights depend on ability n rather than utility u(n): This approach,
which involves non-welfarists elements, allows us to derive a closed-form solution for the
standard optimal tax problem. Atkinson (1995) defends this assumption by noting that
empirical measures of inequality are based on the distribution of gross wages n rather than
utilities.
8This paper considers also a maxi-min objective function where the government cares
only about the least able persons (i.e. agents with skill n0): This is the special case of our
formulation in which `(n) = 0 for n > n0:
93 The optimal tax problem
In optimizing social welfare, the government faces …ve constraints: the …rst-
order and second-order incentive compatibility constraints (3) and (4), the
participation constraint (1), the non-negativity constraint on gross incomes
(5), and the government budget constraint (6). Instead of x(n); we employ
u(n) as a control variable in order to facilitate the inclusion of …rst-order
incentive compatibility (3) into our optimization problem.9 To incorporate
the second-order incentive compatibility constraints, we introduce a non-
negative variable !(n) ´ z0(n) determining how fast z (n) rises with ability















¡‚z (n)[z0 (n) ¡ !(n)] ¡ ·(n)(￿ ¡ u(n)+ v(b))











: ‚u(n) and ‚z (n)
represent the Lagrange multipliers of the …rst-order and second-order in-
centive compatibility constraints, ‚E stands for the multiplier of the gov-
ernment budget constraint, ·(n) denotes the multiplier of the participation
constraint, and – (n) is the Lagrange multiplier of the non-negativity con-
straint on before-tax income.
To further simplify the optimization problem, we observe that, since
z (n) ¸ 0, incentive compatibility (3) implies that utilities do not decline
with skill (i.e. u0 (n) ¸ 0): Accordingly, if the participation constraint
u(n) ¸ ￿ + v(b) is met for skill ¹ n; it is met also for all higher skills n > ¹ n.
De…ning nw as the lowest skill looking for work, we thus have s(n) = 0 for
n < nw and s(n) = ¹ s for n ¸ nw. Accordingly, our model is consistent
with the stylized fact that the extensive margin of labor-supply responses is
especially relevant for low-income earners. Empirical work does show that
these workers respond to tax and bene…t programs mainly on the extensive
rather than the intensive margin of labor supply. This explains the policy
concernthat generous bene…t programs andtaxes onlow earnings discourage
low-income earners from looking for work.
9This is the usual approach in optimal non-linear income tax problems introduced by
Mirrlees (1971). If preferences are quasi linear in leisure, however, it is more convenient
to employ x(n) and nu(n) rather than z(n) and u(n) as controls, see Boadway, Cu¤, and
Marchand (2000). We stick to the Mirrlees approach because we gain less by departing
from it due the introduction of a participation constraint on u(n).
10The agents with skill n < nw can be viewed as being voluntarily unem-
ployed. In our model in which all agents feature the same preferences, the
lower skills n < nw are voluntarily unemployed, whereas the higher skills
n > nw all look for work but may be involuntarily unemployed (if ¹ s < 1).
This is in contrast to Saez (2002), who assumes that agents di¤er not only
in skill levels but also in preferences for full-time leisure. In his setting, all
unemployment is voluntary – with unemployed agents exhibiting a higher
preference for full-time leisure than the employed agents of the same skill
do. Hence, voluntary unemployment is related to not only skill levels but
also preferences. In both Saez (2002) and our model, higher skilled agents
may be unemployed, but for di¤erent reasons. Whereas in Saez (2002) the
higher skilled agents without work value leisure highly and thus do not look
for work, in our model these agents actively search for work but have been
unfortunate enough not to have found a suitable job.
Lemma 2 With voluntary unemployment (i.e. nw > n0); the participation
margin is strictly binding (i.e. u(nw) = ￿ +v(b)).
The reason is that if u(nw) > ￿ +v(b); also agents with skills just below
nw would like to search for jobs that yield the same gross income as type
nw even though they have to work harder to produce this gross income than
skill nw:10 Hence, a solution in which u(nw) > ￿ + v(b) and in which agents
below nw do not search (so that nw is the lowest skill that looks for a job) is
not incentive compatible.





¹ F (nw)v(b) +
£
1¡ ¹ F (nw)
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¡‚z (n)[z0 (n) ¡ !(n)] + ‚E[f(n)¹ sT(n)] + –(n)z (n)
)
dn
¡‚Efb[F (nw) +(1 ¡ F (nw))(1¡ ¹ s)] +Eg
¡·w (￿ ¡ u(nw)+ v(b));
10Formally, u (nw) > ￿+v (b) can be written as v (xw)¡
zw
nw > v (b)+￿; where xw and zw
represent net and gross incomes of the lowest skilled agent who searches for work nw: The
latter inequality implies v (xw)¡
zw
nw¡" > v (b)+￿ for " > 0 small enough. Hence, an agent
with skill (nw ¡") is better-o¤ looking for a job with before-tax income zw (corresponding
to after-tax income of xw) than not entering the labor market.
11where ¹ F(nw) ´
R nw
n0 `(n)f(n)dn. ·w denotes the Lagrange multiplier on
the participation constraint for type nw: It measures the social value of in-
creasing employment by forcing more people to search, and can therefore
be interpreted as the value of a work test (and the required information on
search intensity) inducing more skills to look for work.
The shadow values ‚z (n);–(n);·w are associated with three types of
bunching. ‚z (n) < 0 (implying !(n) ´ z0(n) = 0) corresponds to the case
in which z(n) and x(n) are constant over a range of skills. We call this
bunching due to violation of monotonicity. Also the case –(n) > 0 implies
that gross and net incomes are constant over a range of skills. In contrast
to bunching on account of violation of monotonicity, however, gross incomes
z(n) are necessarily zero over this range so that utility is constant over the
bunching interval (see (3) with z(n) = 0). This is called z = 0 bunching.
The search margin gives rise to an additional type of bunching, namely the
case in which nw > n0 and ·w 6= 0: Accordingly, types n0 · n < nw do not
search. Hence, as voluntarily unemployed, they are bunched without any
labor income and collect social assistance b: This we call s = 0 bunching.
Just as z = 0 bunching, s = 0 bunching can occur only at the bottom of the
skill distribution. It implies that the participation constraint is binding (see
Lemma 2).
Lemma 3 If ￿ > 0, a binding participation constraint u(nw) = ￿ + v(b)
implies z(n) > 0 for n ¸ nw:
Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that z = 0 and s = 0 bunching are mutually
exclusive if search costs ￿ are positive. An agent should not search for a job
in which he does not produce anything (i.e. z(nw) = 0) if the participation
margin is binding (i.e. u(nw) = ￿+v(b)): Leaving such a worker outside the
e¤ective labor force yields no …rst-order impact on private welfare (as welfare
of the marginal worker stays the same)11 nor on the incentive compatibility
constraints of higher skilled agents (since z(nw) = 0 implies u0(nw) = 0).12
Doing so, however, yields a …rst-order gain in terms of government revenue.
The government saves more on in-work bene…ts than what it spends on ad-
ditional welfare bene…ts (as a binding participation margin with z(nw) = 0
implies that v(¡T(nw)) = ￿ + v(b) and thus ¡T(nw) > b if ￿ > 0). Indeed,
11If the search margin is not binding (as is the case in the next section), in contrast,
inducing the worker to search yields a …rst-order gain in private welfare. This may justify
the additional budgetary costs ¡T(nw) ¡ b > 0:
12If z(nw) > 0; leaving one additional skill outside the labor force has consequences for
incentive compatibility (since u0(nw) = z (nw)=n2
w > 0) and hence the intensive margin of
workers. This may justify b + T(nw) < 0 (see sub-section 5.3).
12society reduces economy-wide search costs without any losses for the a¤ected
worker. Providing search subsidies ¡(T(nw) + b) > 0 to a non-productive
worker (i.e. z(nw) = 0) is thus sub-optimal. Compared to in-work bene…ts,
social assistance is a more e¢cient instrument to …ght the poverty of such
agents because this saves search costs.
4 Standard solutions without binding search
margin
Inorder toclearly identify the impact of the searchmargin on theoptimal tax
system, we …rst discuss the case in which the participation constraint is not
binding(i.e. u(n0) > v(b)+￿ so that u(n) ¸ u(n0) > v(b)+￿ and·w = 0). As
all agents look for a job, all unemployment is involuntary. The results in this
section generalize Ebert (1992) and Boadway, Cu¤, and Marchand (2000)
to a non-utilitarian government. Since we are especially interested in the
optimal taxation of low earnings, we elaborate on two reasons why the least
skilled workers may be bunched in the absence of a participation margin,
namely bunching on account of violation of the monotonicity requirement
(in sub-section 4.2) and z = 0 bunching (in sub-section 4.3). These two
types of bunching provide important benchmarks for bunching on account
of a participation margin (analyzed in section 5). By showing that these
types of bunching give rise to unrealistic comparative statics, this section
also motivates the introduction of a binding participation margin in section
5.
Since z0(n) ¸ 0 (see lemma 1), z (n0) ¸ 0 implies that the non-negativity
constraint on gross incomes is satis…ed also for all other skills n > n0: We














¡‚z (n)[z0(n)¡ !(n)] + ‚E[f(n)¹ sT(n)]
)
dn (8)
¡￿¹ s +(1 ¡ ¹ s)v(b) ¡ ‚E[(1¡ ¹ s)b+ E]:








Without any bunching, the optimal solution is characterized as follows.13
Lemma 4 If nw = n0; ·w = 0; z (n0) > 0 and ‚z (n) = 0 for all n 2 [n0;n1];
the solution to maximization problem (8) satis…es





















z (n) = n(v(x(n)) ¡ u(n)) = nv(x(n))¡
Z n
n0
v(x(t))dt + ¹ E ¡ K; (13)








f[tf(t) ¡ (1¡ F (t))]v(x(t)) ¡ x(t)f (t)gdt;
¹ E ´ b






and the marginal tax rate for type n is de…ned as
¿ (n) ´








The marginal utility cost of government revenue ‚E depends only on the
distribution of skills and the social welfare weights `(n): The spending re-
quirement E does not a¤ect it. The reason is that utility is linear in work
e¤ort so that marginal utility costs do not rise if a higher level of government
spending induces agents to work harder. More precisely, a uniform tax on all
agents acts like a lump-sum tax, which yields only income e¤ects and no sub-
stitution e¤ects. With quasi-linear preferences, only labor supply responds
13In particular, this solution is found by assuming that the second-order condition
x0(n) ¸ 0 is met. If the solution implied by (11) violates this condition, the solution
provided in sub-section 4.2 becomes relevant.
14to income e¤ects. Hence, raising one additional euro of tax from each agent
induces all agents to raise their gross incomes by a euro, while net incomes
are una¤ected. Since preferences are linear in leisure, the private utility costs
of one additional unit of gross income do not depend on the level of leisure,
but are inversely proportional to the skill level, 1=n: Indeed, extracting a
euro from a higher skilled agent imposes a lower e¤ort cost than extracting
the same euro from a lower skilled agent. The aggregate welfare e¤ect on the
social objective function, ‚E; corresponds to theweightedpopulation average




n f(n)dn = G(n1).
With ‚E depending only on the distribution ofskills andthe social welfare
weights `(n), also the marginal tax rates can be written in terms of these
elements only. Rewriting equation (10) while using ‚E = G(n1); we obtain
the following expression for the marginal tax rate:
‚E¿(n)nf(n) = ‚E(1 ¡ F(n)) ¡ (G(n1) ¡G(n)): (15)
The marginal tax rate at each skill is determined by trading o¤ the e¢ciency
gains of a lower marginal tax rate and the distributional costs of a more
dispersed income distribution. More speci…cally, consider an increase of one
unit of work e¤ort by type n (i.e. dy(n) = 1), while keeping type n’s utility
constant. With taxation driving a wedge between the social and private
marginal value of work, more work e¤ort generates additional government
revenues ¿ (n)n. Multiplying this with the utility value of government funds,
‚E, and the number of type n agents, f (n), we arrive at the e¢ciency gain
at the left-hand side of (15).
The right-hand side of this equation measures the distributional costs of
higher work e¤ort of type n. In particular, with agents of skill n earning
higher gross incomes, higher ability agents …nd it more attractive to mimic
type n: To prevent these substitution e¤ects, the government has to decrease
gross incomes of all workers who are more skilled than type n by one unit.14
The right-hand side of (15) stands for the costs in terms of the required
additional government revenue ‚E(1¡F(n)) minus the utility bene…ts of the
agents involved (G(n1)¡ G(n)):
14The following two steps show that z (:) has to fall by one unit for all types above n in
order to keep the incentive compatibility constraints satis…ed. First, note that dy (n) = 1
implies dz (n) = n. Hence, in view of u0 (n) =
z(n)
n2 ; u (n) has to increase with an additional
1
n for the type slightly above n (i.e. du0 (n) =
dz(n)
n2 = 1
n with some abuse of notation).
This is achieved by reducing z by one unit for the type slightly above n. Second, as
regards the incentive compatibility constraints for all other types above n, a uniform
decrease in gross incomes z(n) with one unit for all t > n leaves all these constraints
v(x(t)) ¡ z(t)=t ¸ v(x(t0)) ¡ z(t0)=t (for t0;t > n) una¤ected. Hence, such a uniform
decrease in z does not result in any substitution e¤ects for types t > n:
15Expression(10) implies that marginal tax rates at the top and thebottom
are zero (i.e. ¿(n0) = ¿(n1) = 0), while these rates are positive at interior
skills (i.e. ¿(n) > 0 for n0 < n < n1).15 Two factors determine marginal
tax rates in the interior. The …rst factor, the distributional bene…ts of a
higher marginal tax rate (represented by the term [G(n)=G(n1) ¡ F(n)])
raises the marginal tax rate. This termismaximal at the unique ’critical’ skill
level nc at which the welfare weight `(nc)=nc equals the population average




n f(n)dn: The government wants to
redistribute resources to all agents below this critical skill level. The second
factor determining the marginal tax rate is the productive capacity of agents
at type n; nf(n); in the denominator of (10). The higher this productive
capacity, the larger are the e¢ciency costs associated with a higher marginal
tax rate and therefore the lower the marginal tax rate should be.16
Consumption of each skill depends only on the marginal wage rate n(1¡
¿(n)) and not on government spending requirements ¹ E; as consumption de-
pends only on substitution e¤ects and all income e¤ects go into work e¤ort.
Expression (13) implies that additional public spending requirements are
optimally …nanced by uniformly increasing gross incomes of all agents, i.e.
dz(n)=d¹ E = 1: The system is thus recursive. Consumption, marginal tax
rates, and the marginal costs of public funds are determined independently
from public spending, which a¤ectswork e¤ort z(n) requiredtomeet resource
and incentive constraints.
4.2 Bunching due to violation monotonicity
As shown by Guesnerie and La¤ont (1984) and Ebert (1992), the violation
of the monotonicity condition on consumption x(n) makes bunching opti-
mal, that is, z(n) and x(n) are constant over a range of skills. More for-
mally, the restriction !(n) ¸ 0 becomes binding so that ‚z (n) < 0. With
z0(n) ´ !(n) = 0; lemma 1 implies that x0(n) = 0. A so-called ”ironing out”
procedure yields the range of skills over which (gross and net) incomes are
constant. The violation of monotonicity is due to rapidly rising marginal tax
rates. Indeed, risingmarginal tax rates area necessary condition for this type
15This is because the weight
`(n)
n is a declining function of n so that the average of
these weights over the interval [n0;n]; G(n)=F (n); exceeds the average of these weights
over the interval [n0;n1]; G(n1). G(n)=F (n) > G(n1) implies that the numerator of (10)
is positive.
16For particular skill distributions, Diamond (1998) analytically investigates the shapes
of the marginal tax rates for preferences that are quasi-linear in consumption. Boad-
way, Cu¤ and Marchand (2002) conduct a similar analysis for the quasi-linear preferences
explored in our paper.
16of bunching to occur. Since the marginal tax rate is necessarily declining at
the top, this bunching is not possible at the top (see Ebert (1992)).
In contrast to the other two types of bunching, this type of bunching can
happen not only at the bottom but also in the interior of the skill distribu-
tion. Since our analysis focuses on the bottom ofthe labor market, we do not
consider bunching due to violation of monotonicity in the interior of the skill
distribution.17 Moreover, the numerical simulations based on a lognormal
distribution (see section 6) suggest that with reasonable distributions fea-
turing most of their probability mass near the median this bunching occurs
only at the bottom of the skill distribution, as marginal tax rates increase
especially rapidly at these skills.
Lemma 5 The consumption path implied by equation (11) is non-monotone







In this case, types n 2 [n0;nb] feature the same consumption level xb and
production level zb with
xb = x(nb);
zb = z (nb);
where nb is determined by the following equation
f (nb)






= G(n1)F (nb)¡ G(nb); (16)









Production of types n 2 [nb;n1] is determined by
z (n) = nv(x(n)) ¡ nbv(x(xb))¡
Z n
nb
v(x(t))dt+ ¹ E ¡ K;
17Generalizing the equations below for bunching at the bottom to the case of bunching





f[tf (t) ¡ [1¡ F (t)]]v(xb) ¡ f (t)xbgdt+
Z n1
nb
f[tf (t) ¡ [1 ¡F (t)]]v(x(t))¡ f(t)x(t)gdt;
and ¹ E ´ b
(1¡¹ s)
¹ s + E
¹ s .
This type of bunching does not a¤ect the marginal utility cost of gov-
ernment revenue ‚E as given by (9): a higher level of government spending
is still optimally …nanced through a uniform increase in z(n) by all agents.
The marginal utility cost of government spending therefore continues to cor-
respond to the average utility costs of the associated increase in work e¤ort
over the entire population. With the same marginal utility cost of public
funds ‚E, the marginal tax rates (10) and the consumption path (11) in
the non-bunched intervals are not a¤ected by bunching. Accordingly, with
bunching occurring at the bottom of the income distribution, the marginal
tax rate faced by the lowest skilled agent who is not bunched, nb > n0; is pos-
itive (i.e. ¿(nb) > 0). This is in contrast to the case without bunching, when
the lowest non-bunched worker n0 faces a zero marginal tax rate. Intuitively,
a positive marginal tax rate for the lowest non-bunchedworker generates pos-
itive distributional e¤ects only if it redistributes resources towards bunched
workers n < nb; who feature the lowest consumption levels.
4.2.1 comparative statics
Although bunching due to violation of monotonicity does yield strictly posi-
tive marginal tax rates at the bottom of the labor market, we do not believe
this is a relevant description of the bottom of the labor market. This point
is illustrated by the next lemma.
Lemma 6 In case of bunching due to violation of monotonicity, an increase













18Higher public spending (due to a fall in ¹ s or a rise in E or b) leaves
marginal tax rates, and hence consumption levels, una¤ected. Since the
bunching interval [n0;nb] is completely determined by the skill distribution
and the function `(:) (see equation (16)), the level of public spending does
not impact the size of the bunching interval, either. These comparative static
results do not seem to be particularly realistic. This is a main motivation
why we introduce an extensive margin below to explore the impact of public
policy on the bottom of the labor market.
4.3 Bunching with zero work e¤ort
Ifpublic spendingbecomes so lowthat z(n0) becomes zero, a further decrease
in spending ¹ E implies that the non-negativity constraint on z(n0) is binding.
With this constraint being binding, gross and net incomes are constant over
a range of skills. More precisely, gross incomes z(n) are zero over this range.
This, together with (3), implies that also utility is constant over the bunching
interval. Moreover, second-order incentive compatibility z0(n) ¸ 0 implies
that this bunching can occur only at the bottom of the income distribution.
Accordingly, a skill level nz exists so that z(n) = 0 for n 2 [n0;nz].
This type of bunching provides an important benchmark case for the
next section, in which we analyze a binding participation margin with pos-
itive search costs and an exogenous welfare bene…t. The equilibrium with
z = 0 bunching is the outcome also with a binding participation margin if
the labor market does not su¤er from any imperfections (i.e. both search
costs and involuntary unemployment are zero; ￿ = 1¡ ¹ s = 0), while the gov-
ernment can optimally set transfers to agents who do not produce anything




. Indeed, z = 0 bunching captures the case in which agents
stop working on the intensive rather than the extensive margin.18
Withpositivesearchcosts, abindingnon-negativity constraint(i.e. z(nz) =
0 so that x(nz) = z(nz) ¡T(nz) = ¡T(nz)) and a non-binding participation
constraint (i.e. u(nz) = v(x(nz)) ¡ z(nz)=nz = v(x(nz) > v(b) + ￿ so that
x(nz) > b) imply that the government provides a search subsidy to types
n 2 [n0;nz] (i.e. ¡T(n) ¡ b > 0). Intuitively, agents engage in costly search
for a non-productive job (i.e. a job with z = 0) only if the government
subsidizes them for doing so.
18If the government cannot distinguish between working zero hours and having no job
(so that ¡ ~ T(0) = b and thus ¡T(nz) = b), the non-negativity constraint on z(n) can
be binding only if search costs are zero (i.e. ￿ = 0). In that case, the non-negativity
constraint on z(n) is equivalent to the participation constraint; with zero search costs and
the government not being able to distinguish between participation at zero hours and not
participating, the extensive margin coincides with the intensive margin at z = 0:
19Lemma 7 If the solutions in lemma 4 or lemma 5 imply z (n0) < 0; then the
solution to problem (8) can be characterized as follows. First, a non-empty
interval [n0;nz] exists such that
z (n) = 0;
x(n) = xz = x(nz)
for all n 2 [n0;nz]; where x(n) for n ¸ nz is determined by equation (17).
Furthermore, ‚E and nz are determined by the following two equations19
‚E =
¹ F(nz)
nz + G(n1)¡ G(nz)
F(nz)
nzv0(x(nz;‚E)) + 1¡ F(nz)
; (18)




f[nf (n) ¡ [1 ¡ F (n)]]v(x(n)) ¡ f (n)x(n)gdn: (19)
If x(n) as determined by equation (17) is monotonically increasing in n;
equation (19) is upward sloping. If in addition to the monotonicity of x(n);







> 0 for all n 2 [n0;n1]; (20)
then equation (18) is downward sloping.
Finally,
‚E · G(n1);
¿ (nz) > 0:
For skills n ¸ nz; marginal tax rates and consumption levels continue to
be determined by equations (11) and (15). Unlike bunching due to the viola-
tion of monotonicity, z = 0 bunching does impact the marginal utility cost of
government revenue ‚E: In particular, raising government spending increases
work e¤ort only outside the bunching interval (for skills n > nz). Within
the bunching interval, consumption is reduced so that utility of the bunched
agents declines with the same amount as the marginal worker nz (see the …rst
term in the numerator at the right-hand side of (18)). Higher government
19The …rst equation has the advantage that it is easy to interpret, but the right-hand
side also contains ‚E in the v0 (x (nz)) term. The appendix shows that this equation can






20spending is thus …nanced by not only more work e¤ort but also less private
consumption (the additional government revenue from lower consumption of
the bunched individuals is given by the …rst term in the denominator at the
right-hand side of (18)). For the constrained households, consumption is val-
ued relatively less (the non-negativity constraint on work e¤ort acts like an
implicit subsidy on consumption, i.e. v0(x(n0)) < 1=n0). This explains why
the marginal cost of public funds is lower with z = 0 bunching than without
it (i.e. ‚E · G(n1)).
The marginal tax rate facing the least skilled worker nz is positive (i.e.
¿(nz) > 0). The reasonis that a positivetax rate for the lowest skilled worker
yields positive distributional e¤ects because it redistributes resources from
the productive workers (i.e. the skills n > nz) towards the non-productive
workers, who feature the lowest consumption levels. With z = 0 bunching,
marginal tax rates remain positive in the interior. However, ‚E · G(n1)
and (15) imply that marginal tax rates at n > nz are smaller than without
z = 0 bunching. Intuitively, the bene…ts of redistribution are smaller if
low-skilled agents can use additional resources only to increase consumption
(which yields less marginal utility than lower work e¤ort does).
Figure 1 shows the equations (18) and (19) in (nz;‚E) space. Equation
(18), which we interpret as labor supply, is downward sloping if x0(n) > 0
and condition (20) is satis…ed. The intuition is the following. As nz goes up,
it becomes more attractive for types above nz to stop working as well (i.e.
mimic type nz). To prevent this from happening, consumption must rise for
the employed which implies that ‚E must fall (see equation (17)).20
Equation (19), which can be interpreted as the government budget con-
straint, is upward sloping in (nz;‚E) space. At constant ‚E; a more skilled
marginal worker nz raises transfers to all non-productive workers (as ¡T(n)
= x(n) = x(nz) for n = nz while the monotonicity requirement implies that
x(nz) rises with nz) and reduces net taxes on all productive workers (as
putting an additional worker out of work requires reducing the net tax level
of that type – and thus of all workers above it). To bring the government
budget back into balance, a higher level of‚E must reduce consumption((17)
20More precisely, as nz increases, a more skilled worker determines the consumption level
of the bunched skills [n0;nz]. Since x0 (n) > 0; this implies the least skilled agents enjoy
higher consumption levels. At these higher consumption levels of these low-skilled agents,
redistributing resources from these skills to the higher skills should not raise social welfare
(i.e. ‚u (n) should be continuous at nz). This can be the case only if also the skills above
nz enjoy higher consumption and hence higher utility in response to the rise in nz. This
implies that ‚E must decline. Clearly, this is true only if a decline in ‚E does not increase
consumption of the skills [n0;nz] by more than that of the skills [nz;n1]: Condition (20),
which is satis…ed for the lognormal distribution employed in the simulations below, is
su¢cient for a fall in ‚E to bene…t the group [nz;n1] relatively more than [n0;nz].
21implies that a higher level of ‚E reduces consumption at …xed n) and raise
the work e¤ort of more productive skills. Indeed, the further we move up
on this curve, the more we redistribute resources from the rich to the poor
(the associated positive income e¤ects for the poor induce more low-skilled
agents to stop working).
4.3.1 comparative statics
The agents who are bunched at z = 0 can be viewed as being unemployed.
The next lemma explains why we do not believe this type of unemployment
is a relevant description of the unemployment problem faced by actual gov-
ernments.
Lemma 8 In case of z = 0 bunching and under the assumption that condi-























A higher level of welfare bene…ts raising public spending shifts the cost of
redistribution upwards, thereby reducing the number of agents who are non
productive. In contrast to the case without z = 0 bunching, a higher level
of government spending raises the marginal cost of public funds. Intuitively,
in the absence of z = 0 bunching, more of the required resources need to
come from additional work e¤ort rather than from less private consumption.
Unlike the case with bunching due to violation of monotonicity, more public
spending reduces the size of the bunching interval. Higher welfare bene…ts
raising the public spending requirement thus increase the number of agents
22who exert positive work e¤ort, as higher spending requirements leave less
room for generous in-work bene…ts. In addition to all bunched agents, also
agents n > nz consume less (in the face of a higher marginal tax burden)
and su¤er a decline in utility.21
The model thus implies that a higher level of public spending, including
higher welfare bene…ts, reduces the number of unemployed agents. This is
not realistic, thereby providing a motivation for the introductionof a binding
participation margin in the next section.
5 Solutions with binding search margins
This section considers the case where the participation marginis binding (i.e.
u(nw) = v(b) +￿ and ·w 6= 0). With a binding participation margin, we can
distinguish the cases without (nw = n0) and with voluntary unemployment
(nw > n0). These two cases are discussed in turn. In particular, we formalize
the following cases. First, the government attracts all types into work and
the lowest type n0 faces a strictly positive marginal tax rate. Second, the
government does not want the lowest types to participate in the labor market
and the lowest participating type faces a strictly positive marginal tax rate.
Finally, we show that it is also possible that the lowest participating type
collects a search subsidy (T (nw) +b < 0) and faces a negative marginal tax
rate.
5.1 No voluntary unemployment
If the searchmargin is binding, the solution tothe government’s optimization
problem has the following characteristics.
Proposition 9 In the case where u(n0) = v(b) + ￿ and ·0 > 0; we have
z(n0) > 0
f (n0)¹ s‚E(b +T (n0)) ¸ ·0u0(n0) > 0 (21)
b+ T (n0)
z(n0)
¸ ¿(n0) > 0 (22)
21The comparative static results illustrate that the case with z = 0 bunching resem-
bles the so-called rich economy if skills are observable to the government (see Boone and
Bovenberg (2001)). In both cases, higher public spending yields not only higher work e¤ort
but also lower consumption for the non-productive individuals. Moreover, it reduces the
number of these non-productive workers. Indeed, in both cases, all agents are searching
for work (i.e. nw = n0). Furthermore, there is a skill level below which agents are not





As above, x(n) is determined by equation (17). Utility u(:) and production
z (:) are given by the same expressions as in lemma 4, while welfare can be
written as




The observation that production z(n0) is strictly positive was proved in
lemma 3. Expression(21) is the condition that implies acorner solutionnw =
n0. Intuitively, with abinding participationconstraint (i.e. u(n0) = v(b)+￿),
the lowest skill n0 is indi¤erent between searching or not. Encouraging the
least able type to look for a job therefore yields no direct …rst-order welfare
e¤ects for this type. The …rst inequality in (21) therefore compares the
external bene…ts and costs of inducing the least skilled to search. The left-
hand side represents the external bene…ts of encouraging these types to look
for work; the government budget bene…ts from low-skilled employment if
welfare bene…ts exceed in-work bene…ts (i.e. b+T (n0) > 0). The right-hand
side stands for the external costs of employing the least skilled in terms of
tightening the incentive compatibility constraint for work e¤ort. With the
lowest skill being employed, higher skills …nd it more attractive to mimic
these skills by providing less work e¤ort.
The government thus faces a trade-o¤ between obtaining revenues from
either inducing all agents to search so as to maximize overall employment or
encourage a smaller group of employed agents to work harder. One can state
this dilemma also as one between raising production through more employ-
ment and raising it through a higher labor productivity level (interpreting y
as work e¤ort rather than hours worked), or, alternatively, as one between
increasing labor supply on the extensive margin and raising it on the inten-
sive margin. Indeed, we can rewrite equation (21) as (22), that is in terms
of a trade-o¤ between the distortion of the participation (or extensive) mar-
gin and the e¤ort (or intensive) margin.22 In particular, all workers should
22With a binding participation contraint, violation of the monotonicity constraint is
less likely. The reason is that a binding participation contraint limits the increase in the
marginal tax rate at the bottom of the skill distribution by lifting the marginal tax rate
at the bottom ¿(n0) above zero. In mathematical terms, with a larger value of ‚E as





more likely to be decreasing in n (i.e. as ‚E increases, the derivative of the right-hand
side with respect to n becomes smaller). Lemma 20 in the appendix characterizes the case
in which both the participation and monotonicity constraint x0 (n) ¸ 0 are binding at n0:
24search if the average tax on work at the bottom (i.e. the left-hand side of
(22)) exceeds the marginal tax rate on additional work e¤ort at the bottom
(i.e. the right-hand side of (22)). Intuitively, if the distortion on the exten-
sive margin is more serious than the distortion on the intensive margin of
labor supply, then all agents should search because combatting distortions
on the extensive margin by inducing agents to search is more important than
…ghting distortions on the intensive margin by encouraging agents to work
harder.
The marginal tax rate on the lowest skill is positive (i.e. ¿(n0) > 0). This
result contrasts with the familiar result from the optimal tax literature that,
in the absence of bunching at the bottom and a participation constraint,
the lowest skill should face a zero marginal tax rate (see Seade (1977)).
Intuitively, with a binding search constraint, the government is forced to
raise utility u(n0) = v(b) + ￿ of the least skilled type n0 above the level
(associated with a zero marginal tax rate ¿ (n0) = 0) chosen in the absence
of this constraint. To prevent higher skills from mimicing the more attractive
income bundle of the lowest type n0; the government distorts the work e¤ort
of this latter type. In particular, by reducing (net and gross) incomes x(n0)
and z (n0); a strictly positive marginal tax rate ¿ (n0) > 0 makes the income
bundle (x(n0);z (n0)) less attractive for higher types. This result parallels
that of amonopolist engaging insecond-order pricediscriminationby o¤ering
a menu of goods with di¤erent qualities and prices. As shown by Mussa
and Rosen (1978), such a monopolist o¤ers an ine¢ciently low quality level
to the lowest type in order to be able to extract more rents from buyers
featuring higher reservationprices. Also inthat application, the participation
constraint of the lowest type gives rise to a distortion at the bottom. In our
application, the government optimally adjusts the taxation of low-skilled
agents in order to induce these agents to continue to look for work, while at
the same time minimizing the tax revenues that have to be givenup to higher
types. This result of a positive marginal tax rate at the bottom illustrates the
importance of examiningthe taxsystem inconjunctionwithsocial assistance.
Indeed, the government reduces the tax burden on low-skilled workers as an
instrument to contain welfare spending rather than to alleviate poverty of
these workers.
Without the binding participation margin, the marginal cost of public
funds depends only on the distribution of skills (i.e. ‚E = G(n1), see
(9)). If the participation margin is binding, ‚E needs to be larger (i.e.
Unlike the case without a binding participation constraint, this type of bunching a¤ects
the marginal utility cost of government revenue ‚E:
25‚E > G(n1)).23 The intuition behind the higher marginal cost of public
funds is that the additional behavioral margin of labor-market search makes
labor supply behavior more sensitive to tax distortions. In particular, agents
can respond to taxation by not only adjusting work e¤ort but also search
behavior. Hence, in addition to marginal tax rates, also average tax rates
impact laborsupply. Indeed, a uniform increaseinthetax burdenis no longer
equivalent to a lump-sum tax, since such a tax increase induces low-skilled
agents to stop searching for a job.
5.1.1 comparative statics with respect to public spending
Lemma 10 If u(n0) = v(b) + ￿ and ·0 > 0; marginal changes in the public


























Rather than uniformly increasing the tax burden throughout the skill
distribution (as in the case without a binding participation margin (see sec-
tion 4)), the government optimally protects the utility level of the least able
workers so as to prevent these workers from leaving the labor market. In-
stead, it gradually increases the tax burden with skill so as to minimize the
distortions in work e¤ort. Compared to the case without a binding participa-
tion margin, the rich thus …nance a larger part of the additional government
23This contrasts with the z = 0 bunching case, where ‚E is smaller rather than larger
than G(n1).
26spending, as this participation margin renders the labor-supply response of
low-skilled workers more elastic. The higher marginal tax rates associated
with a more progressive tax system induce all workers to cut their consump-
tion. This erodes the tax base, thereby increasing the marginal cost of public
funds ‚E (see also equation (23)). These comparative static results contrast
with the cases without any bunching or with bunching due to violation of
monotonicity studied in sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2. In these latter cases, more
work e¤ort provides all the …nancing for additional public spending.
5.1.2 comparative statics with respect to the welfare system
To explore the interaction between social assistance and the labor tax, we
consider the impact of a higher welfare bene…t b. These e¤ects are similar to
the comparative statics in lemma 10, except that
du(n0)
db > 0 as an increase
in b raises u(n0) = v(b) + ￿. Indeed, a higher welfare bene…t induces the
government to cut the average tax burden on low-skilled workers in order
to encourage them to continue to look for a job. The least skilled workers
thus indirectly bene…t from more generous social assistance, even though
only the involuntarily unemployed collect these bene…ts. Both the lower tax
burden on low earnings and the higher welfare bene…ts for the involuntary
unemployed are …nanced by skilled workers. In this way, the increased im-
portance of the participation margin raises marginal tax rates throughout
the skill distribution, thereby worsening distortions on the intensive margin
of labor supply. Re‡ecting these distortionary substitution e¤ects, all work-
ers cut their consumption. Despite their lower consumption level, the least
able workers enjoy a higher level of utility arising from a lower average tax
burden resulting in less work e¤ort.24
Lemma 11 If u(n0) = v(b)+￿ and ·0 > 0; marginal changes in search costs







24These impacts on low-skilled workers are similar to those found by Weymark (1987) for
an increase in the welfare weight for the least skilled agent. Indeed, a binding participation
constraint for the least able types n0 implies that the government attaches a higher weight
to transfers to these types than in the absence of the participation constraint. A higher




















Lower search costs ￿ indicate more e¢cient labor market matching asso-
ciated with a more ‡exible labor market. Alternatively, a decline in ￿ can be
viewed as resulting from more active labor-market policies helping agents to
…nd work. Search costs are reduced, for example, by o¤ering agents jobs in
the public sector in the context of welfare-to-work programs. Lower search
costs substitute for in-work bene…ts as an instrument to induce low-skilled
workers to search. The higher tax revenues from low-skilled workers allow
the government to cut marginal taxes throughout the skill distribution. In
this way, welfare-to-work programs help to alleviate the distortions on the
intensive margin of labor supply. Ceteris paribus the level of welfare bene…ts,
these programs redistribute resources from the poor to the rich.
5.2 With voluntary unemployment
Witha binding participation margin, the…rst inequality in(21) does not nec-
essarily hold. In that case, the government …nds it optimal not to encourage
the least able agents to search for a job; these agents thus remain voluntarily
unemployed. Types n0 · n < nw are bunched without any labor income and
instead collect the welfare bene…t b: Consequently, the government employs
passive welfare bene…ts instead of active labor-market policies to …ght the
poverty of these low-skilled agents. The lower bound on the observed wage
distribution nw can be viewed as the e¤ective minimum wage (or wage ‡oor)
implied by the welfare bene…t b and the taxes on labor income.
For the marginal worker nw; the equivalent of the …rst inequality in (21)
is binding:25
25As noted above, we ignore violations of monotonicity in the main text. With a binding
28b+T (nw) = ¿(nw)z(nw): (24)
This expression states that for the marginal worker the distortion on the ex-
tensive margin (i.e. the left-hand side of (24)) should equal the distortion on
the intensive margin (i.e. the right-hand side of (24)).26 To understand this
equation, one should …rst note that the marginal type is indi¤erent between
participating and not participating, hence this agent’s utility does not enter
the equation determining nw. E¤ects on the government budget and other
agents thus determine the optimal employment level. The left-hand side
of (24) represents the direct budgetary implications of raising employment
by reducing nw: by bringing a marginal worker into work, the government
saves a welfare bene…t b and collects additional tax revenue T(nw). The in-
direct implications, namely the e¤ects on other workers, are captured by the
right-hand side of (24)). Bringing a marginal type nw into work encourages
workers who are marginally more skilled to work less hard – as they can
now mimic type nw.27 An optimal tax system balances the welfare implica-
tions of this latter behavioral response on the intensive margin of the more
productive workers (represented by the right-hand side of (24)28) with the
budgetary implications of the behavioral response on the extensive margin
of the marginal workers. The government thus faces a trade-o¤ between ob-
taining revenues from either inducing more agents to search or encouraging
participation constraint and voluntary unemployment, violation of the monotonicity re-
quirement is less likely (see also the numerical simulations below). The reason is that the
search margin takes those low-skilled agents out of the labor market who, in the absence
of the search margin, would be bunched (with positive work e¤ort) on account of violation
of monotonicity.
26This expression can be stated as
b+T(nw)
z(nw) = ¿(nw); where the right-hand side is closely
related to the replacement rate (in after-tax terms).
b+T (nw)
z(nw) indicates which part of gross
labor income in a marginal job z(nw) is taxed away through withdrawn welfare bene…ts b
and additional labor taxes T(nw):
27If the government could observe skills, it would eliminate the search distortion of the
marginal worker because it does not need to worry about the implications of doing so for
the intensive margin of more e¢cient workers (see Boone and Bovenberg (2001)).
28To see this, note that a higher employment level implies that marginal workers must
enjoy more utility from work in order to convince them to search. This forces the gov-
ernment to increase also the utilities of all types above nw so as to maintain incentive
compatibility of work e¤ort. Since u0 (nw) =
z(nw)
n2




w as nw starts participating and hence decreases his production by
dz =
z(nw)
nw : Such a cut in gross incomes for all types above nw leaves incentive com-
patibility intact. Using (15), the net welfare e¤ect of reducing gross output in this way, h







nw ; can be written (in terms of government revenues
per additional marginal worker employed) as the right-hand side of (24).
29a smaller group of agents to work harder. We now characterize the solution.
Proposition 12 With voluntary unemployment (i.e. nw > n0), the solution
can be characterized as follows
v0 (xw) =













f[tf (t) ¡ [1¡ F (t)]]v(x(t)) ¡ x(t)f (t)gdt
in the unknowns xw;nw and ‚E, where x(n) is determined by equation (17)
for n ¸ nw and xw = x(nw): The solution satis…es the properties xw > b;















The solution for the marginal tax rate can be written as
¿ (n) = 1¡
G(n1)¡G(n)
‚E +f(n)n ¡ [1 ¡ F (n)]
nf (n)
; (29)











where K is de…ned as
K ´
1
1 ¡ F (nw)
· R n1
nw f[tf (t) ¡ [1 ¡F (t)]]v(x(t))¡ x(t)f (t)gdt
¡F (nw)b¡ ¹ E
¸
:
Gross income of a type n ¸ nw is determined by
z (n) = n(v(x(n))¡ u(n)):
Overall welfare amounts to





30The system is recursive in that equation (25) determining the consump-
tion level of the marginal worker, xw = x(nw); depends on neither ‚E nor
nw: As shown in the appendix, this expression is equivalent to (24). It de-
termines the minimum production level (and given the binding participation
constraint also the minimum consumption level) that makes it worthwhile for
the government to encourage an agent to search for work and thus employ
active labor-market policies rather than welfare bene…ts as an instrument to
alleviate poverty. The production in a marginal job needs to be su¢cient to
o¤set the searchcosts and the decline in production of more e¢cient workers.
The consumption level xw can thus be viewed as the reservation income for
the government to have agents search.
To see what determines the consumption gap between the lowest working
type and the unemployed, xw ¡b; we substitute the Taylor expansion v(b) =
v(xw) + v0(xw)(b ¡ xw) + 1=2v00(»)(b ¡ xw)2 (where b < » < xw) into (25).
This yields ￿ = ¡1=2v00(»)(b ¡ xw)2; so that reservation consumption is a




The optimal gap between the consumptionlevel of marginal workers, xw; and
that of the unemployed, b; thus depends on search costs ￿ and the concavity
of utility from consumption, v(:).29 Large search costs imply that marginal
workers need to be rather productive (and thus enjoy relatively high con-
sumption levels) in order to make it worthwhile to have them search for a
job. A concave utility function, in contrast, implies that unequal consump-
tion levels of x and b become rather costly. Hence, the government optimally
limits the gap between consumption of workers and the unemployed.
Just aswiththebunchingcasesinsection4, we …ndtheoptimum by deriv-
ing two relationships between ‚E and the marginal skill (nw in this case). In
(nw;‚E) space (as illustrated in …gure 2), labor supply (26) is upwardsloping
and the government budget constraint (27) is downward sloping in equilib-
rium.30 Labor supply (26) models the optimal trade-o¤ between the incen-
tive constraints (i.e. …rst-order incentive compatibility and the participation
constraint) at di¤erent employment levels. If ‚E increases, consumption as
29By reducing xw; a more concave utility function shifts up equation (26) in (nw;‚E)
space, thereby raising ‚E and hence (from (29)) marginal tax rates. This result contrasts
with sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2, in which ‚E and marginal tax rates do not depend on the
concavity of the utility function.
30If the two equations do not intersect because equation (26) lies everywhere above
(27), then nw = n0: Hence, we are in the situation considered in section 5.1 without any
voluntary unemployment. If equation (26) lies everywhere below (27), then the incentive
constraints do not allow the government to …nance its spending requirement.
31determined by (17) falls for each working type n. Hence, an agent needs to
be more productive to meet the participation constraint (u(nw) = v(b)+￿)
and nw goes up. More generous welfare bene…ts and larger search costs re-
duce labor supply by raising productivity standards, thereby shifting the
labor-supply curve (26) to the right in (nw;‚E) space. An alternative inter-
pretation of (26) is that this relationship captures the marginal bene…ts of
using active labor-market policies (rather than passive welfare bene…ts) as
an instrument to combat poverty. These bene…ts rise with the level of un-
employment. More generous welfare bene…ts and larger search costs reduce
these bene…ts, thereby shifting the upward-sloping relationship (26) down-
ward in (nw;‚E) space. The government budget constraint (27) represents
the costs of these active labor-market policies.
As shown in …gure 2, the curve (26) features an asymptote at nw = ~ nw in
(‚E;nw) space. In order to interpret ~ nw, we de…ne g(nw;‚E) as government
expenditure that can be …nanced (with a marginal utility cost of public funds
‚E and a marginal skill level nw)
g(nw;‚E) ´ ¹ s
Z n1
nw
f[tf (t)¡ [1¡ F (t)]]v(x(t)) ¡ f (t)x(t)gdt
¡nw (1¡ F (nw))¹ s(v(b) +￿) + b[1 ¡(1¡ F (nw)) ¹ s];
where x(t) is determined by equation (17).












> 0 if nw 2 [n0; ~ nwi
= 0 if nw = ~ nw
< 0 if nw 2 h~ nw;n1]
:
Furthermore,
T (~ nw)+ b > 0:
At nw = ~ nw; the government collects the largest possible tax revenues
(net of spending on welfare bene…ts). Accordingly, g(~ nw;‚E) is the max-
imum amount of government spending E that can …nanced. A Leviathan
government, which maximizes tax revenues g(nw;‚E) and thus sets nw = ~ nw,
distorts the extensive margin (i.e. T (~ nw) + b > 0) because this allows it to
collect more tax revenues from types nw > ~ nw: Indeed, by leaving type n0
w
for which T (n0
w)+b = 0 out of the labor force, types nw > n0
w can no longer
mimic n0
w so that the government can raise more tax revenues from these
types nw > n0
w: To o¤set the adverse e¤ects of additional employment on
32tax revenues from higher types, the government budget must bene…t directly
from the employment of a marginal type (i.e. T (~ nw) +b > 0):
In the solution to the planner’s problem, we have nw < ~ nw: Accordingly,
employment is subsidized in the sense that a reduction in employment would
yield additional revenues (i.e.
@g(nw;‚E)
@nw > 0). The government budget con-
straint (27) is thus downward sloping over the relevant range (i.e. around the
equilibrium value determined by (26) and (27)):31 a higher level of employ-
ment (i.e. a decrease in nw) harms the government budget and thus requires
an increase in the marginal cost of public funds ‚E to bring the budget back
into balance. This contrasts with the case in which the non-negativity con-
straint on gross income is binding. In that case, the government budget
constraint is upward sloping: a reduction in employment raises the marginal
costs of public funds.
5.2.1 comparative statics with respect to public spending























More public spending raises the marginal costs of active labor-market
policies, which as indicated above are a net drain on the government budget
31This assumes that search costs ￿ are positive. If ￿ = 0; the government budget con-
straint is horizontal at the equilibrium. Intuitively, in the absence of search costs, inducing
agents to search through active labor-market policies does not involve any budgetary costs.
33(since nw < ~ nw). As a direct consequence, marginal skills nw leave the labor
market. In contrast to the case in which both z = 0 bunching and a binding
participation margin are absent (see sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2), more pub-
lic spending raises marginal tax rates and the marginal cost of public funds.
Intuitively, in the presence ofthe additional behavioral marginof search, gov-
ernment spending can no longer be …nanced in a non-distortionary fashion.
Indeed, the binding participation margin implies that a uniform increase in
labor taxes (i.e. dT(n) = dT > 0 for nw ¸ n0) no longer acts as a lump-sum
tax but harms labor supply of the marginal worker. To alleviate distortions
on the extensive labor-supply margin of low-skilled workers, the government
raises a relatively large share of the required additional tax revenues from
higher skills. The implied increase in marginal tax rates induces workers to
substitute away from consumption towards leisure. As public spending in-
creases, the implied distortions on the intensive labor-supply margin worsen,
thereby further increasing the marginal costs of public spending. Equation















1¡F(nw)¿(nw): Whereas the …rst term (between
square brackets) stands for the marginal cost in the absence of behavioral
responses, the second term
1
1¡￿ represents additional costs as a consequence
of behavioral responses.
We can compare the response to higher public spending also with the cor-
responding response in an economy in which the non-negativity constraint
on gross income is binding (see sub-section 4.3). In both economies, part of
the additional public spending is …nanced through lower private consump-
tion rather than additional work e¤ort. Moreover, higher public spending
raises marginal tax rates. A major di¤erence, however, is that the number
of productive workers rises rather than falls in an economy in which work-
ers stop working on the intensive margin (i.e. an economy in which the
non-negativity constraint on gross income is binding).32 The reason for this
di¤erent employment response in the latter economy is that more produc-
tive workers help the government budget by reducing spending on generous
in-work bene…ts. If the participation constraint is binding and the welfare
bene…t b is exogenous, in contrast, more employment increases budgetary
32These di¤erences in employment responses resemble the di¤erent responses with ob-
servable types (see Boone and Bovenberg (2001)) in a so-called normal economy (in which
additional spending reduces productive employment) versus a so-called rich economy (in
which additional spending raises productive employment).
34pressures as it requires more spending on costly active labor market policies
to induce workers to enter the labor market. This illustrates how a binding
participation margin fundamentally alters the structure of an economy and
hence the constraints faced by a government setting its tax policy.
5.2.2 comparative statics with respect to the welfare system



























for all n 2 hnw;n1i.
If ¿ (nw) > 0 and
d¿(n)
dn · 0 around nw and a rise in b isnot Pareto improving,
then the results above hold irrespective of the values for ¹ E and ￿: Moreover,







for n close to nw.
Larger unemployment bene…ts raise unemployment throughtwochannels.
First, the marginal cost of active labor-market policies increase as higher in-
work bene…ts have to be paid to low-skilled agents in order to induce them
to enter the labor market. This e¤ect shifts the government budget locus
(27) upward. Second, the marginal bene…ts of active labor-market policies
decrease as the welfare system takes on a larger role in combatting poverty.
As a direct consequence, less redistribution has to be carried out through
the tax system. Indeed, a higher welfare bene…t raises the productivity re-
quirements for marginal workers, xw; so that the bene…t locus of active labor
35market policies (26) shifts down. With the marginal costs of these policies
rising and the associated bene…ts falling, voluntary unemployment unam-
biguously rises. With higher welfare bene…ts, society relies more on these
passive bene…ts rather than on in-work tax bene…ts to redistribute resources
towards low-skilled agents.
The impact of larger welfare bene…ts on the marginal costs of public
funds (and hence on marginal tax rates and consumption levels of workers)
depends on which e¤ect is stronger: the fall in bene…ts of active labor market
policies or the increase in costs of these policies. The cost e¤ect dominates
if in (nw;‚E) space the downward-sloping government budget locus (27) is
relatively ‡at compared to the upward-sloping bene…t locus (26). This is in
factthe normal case, implyingthata higher welfarebene…t typically increases
the marginal costs of public funds and hence marginal tax rates.33 In fact,
one can show that this is indeed the case if search costs ￿ are relatively
small (so that the budget locus is relatively ‡at) or public spending E is
large (so that the bene…t curve is close to its asymptote ~ nw so that this
curve is steep). Furthermore, the marginal cost of public funds (and hence
marginal tax rates) increases with b if marginal tax rates are positive and
declining with skill close to the marginal worker nw and if a rise in b is not
Pareto improving.34 In the normal case, in addition to the unemployed, also
marginal workers (i.e. workers with skills close to nw) bene…t from higher
welfare bene…ts. The result that ‚E and hence marginal tax rates rise as
a result of larger welfare bene…ts is analogous to the unambiguous impacts
of more generous social assistance on these variables if all workers search
(see section 5.1.2). Also in that case, higher welfare bene…ts raise in-work
bene…ts for marginal workers, which are …nanced throughhigher tax rates on
skilled workers, implying higher marginal tax rates and a more progressive
tax system.
We can compare the comparative static results on higher welfare bene-
…ts for an economy in which the non-negativity constraint on gross incomes
rather than the participation constraint is binding. At very low welfare ben-
e…ts (and relatively low spending requirements E), increasing these bene…ts
33The bene…t e¤ect dominates the cost e¤ect (and the marginal cost of public funds
‚E thus declines) only if the bene…t curve (26) is ‡at enough. The bene…t curve is ‡at if
agents are almost bunched in the sense that consumption levels do not rise quickly with
n: That is, the equilibrium value of nw is close to n in …gure 2. In that case, the higher
productivity requirements associated with a higher welfare bene…t induces a substantial
number of agents to stop searching, thereby saving substantial search costs (especially
because the steep government budget curve signals that search costs ￿ are high).
34Although we do not analyze the case in which b is set to maximize welfare, it seems
reasonable to exclude the case in which a rise in b yields a Pareto improvement.
36raises productive employment, as higher welfare bene…ts reduce the bud-
getary room to pay generous in-work bene…ts to low-skilled workers in un-
productive jobs. More agents have to work in order to help …nance the larger
bene…ts to the involuntarily unemployed. If welfare bene…ts are raised, the
participation margin eventually becomes binding, and further increasing the
welfare bene…t reduces employment. Hence, the relationship between welfare
bene…ts and productive employment is U-shaped. At low welfare bene…ts,
the adverse income e¤ects associated with higher taxation on account of
higher welfare discourage agents from exiting the labor market through the
intensive margin. At high welfare bene…ts, in contrast, larger welfare bene…ts
encourage agents to exit the labor market through the extensive margin.
As a result of these di¤erent employment impacts of welfare bene…ts, also
the relationship between these bene…ts and the level of in-work bene…ts ap-
pears to be U-shaped. At low welfare bene…ts, the participation marginis not
binding. As welfare bene…ts are raised from a low initial level, these bene…ts
absorb the budgetary room for generous in-work bene…ts as an instrument to
…ght poverty. At low welfare bene…ts, social assistance and in-work bene…ts
are thus substitutes in …ghting poverty. As welfare bene…ts are increased
further, however, the participation constraint for marginal workers becomes
binding and the government needs to raise in-work bene…ts to encourage
agents to look for work. At high levels of social assistance, therefore, in-
work bene…ts and welfare bene…ts become complements: in-work bene…ts
help to o¤set the impact of more generous social assistance on the partici-
pation constraint. This U-shaped relationship between in-work bene…ts and
social assistance reveals that generous in-work bene…ts are called for in both
countries with low and high welfare bene…ts, but for di¤erent reasons. In
countries with low welfare bene…ts (such as the United States), in-work ben-
e…ts are aimed at poverty alleviation. In countries with more generous social
assistance (such as most European countries), in contrast, in-work bene…ts
protect the incentives to participate in the labor market.
The e¤ects of smaller search costs have the same sign as the e¤ects of
smaller unemployment bene…ts. Hence, in the normal case, government
policies aimed at reducing search costs help to decrease marginal tax rates
throughout the skill distribution.
5.3 Excessive employment
This section shows that in-work bene…ts may be so large that search is actu-
ally subsidized, i.e. b+ T (nw) < 0.
37Proposition 16 If nw > n0 it is possible that
·w < 0;
b+ T (nw) < 0;
¿ (nw) < 0:




for all types n > nw where ¿ (n) < 0.
With positive search costs and a binding non-negativity constraint on
gross income, sub-section 4.3 showed that the government provides a search
subsidy to marginal workers nz. The proposition shows that with voluntary
unemployment (implying that the participation constraint rather than the
non-negativity constraint on gross income is binding), the government may
also optimally provide a search subsidy to marginal workers nw: The condi-
tion for the optimal level ofvoluntary unemploymentf (nw)¹ s‚E(b+ T (nw)) =
·wu0(nw) implies that a search subsidy for the marginal worker b + T (nw)
< 0 is associatedwith ·w < 0 so that afurther increase in employment harms
welfare. Moreover, the negative shadow value ·w implies that participation
restriction u(nw) = v(b) + ￿ is binding from below: u(n) · v(b) + ￿ for
n < nw is the relevant constraint. Instead of attracting types n ¸ nw into
work, the government wants to keep types n < nw out of the laborforce. This
provides a rationale for hiring and …ring costs. Employment could also be
discouraged by imposing a minimum earnings requirement on jobs. Hence,
by prohibiting jobs that earn less than zmin > 0; the government facilitates
generous tax bene…ts to low-skilled workers.
In the presence of search subsidies b+T (nw) < 0; the government faces a
trade-o¤ between redistributing to agents with low productivity and contain-
ing search costs ￿.35 With exogenous welfare bene…ts, it can redistribute to
low productivity agents only by providing rather generous in-work bene…ts.
Additional redistribution, however, results in more entry into the labor force.
With search subsidies b + T (nw) < 0; the government budget bears part of
the search costs associated with this additional entry: an increase in employ-
ment implies a direct burden on the government budget, as the additional
in-work bene…ts ¡T(nw) exceed the welfare bene…t b the government saves.
These additional budgetary costs of redistribution stop the government from
35In the presence of search subsidies, voluntary unemployment can exist only with posi-
tive search costs. Indeed, agents refrain from search only if they have to incur search costs
in order to take advantage of the higher public bene…ts in employment (i.e. ¡T(nw) > b).
38redistributing more to the bottom of the skill distribution and explain why
the shadow price ·w is negative. Search subsidies are likely to be optimal
if not only b but also E are rather low (so that the government has the
budgetary means to provide generous in-work bene…ts to unskilled workers),
while at the same time search costs ￿ are high (so that the government wants
to contain entry costs). The simulations in section 6 con…rm this.
We overturn the standard result from the literature on optimal non-linear
income taxation that marginal tax rates should be positive in the interior
of the skill distribution. The negative marginal tax rate ¿ (nw)36 can be
explained in two ways. First, the government likes to redistribute to less
productive agents but at the same time wants to avoid excessive search. To
reconcile these two objectives, it grants the largest in-work subsidies to types
above nw rather than to nw (as this would draw types n < nw into the labor
force). Hence, the marginal tax rate is negative at nw: Second, in order
to separate the types at the bottom of the labor force (and thus make it
unattractive for the types below nw to mimic type nw by searching for a
job), the government induces marginal workers nw to supply excessive labor
on the intensive margin (which is cheaper for type nw than for types below
nw); implying that excessive labor supply on the extensive margin spreads to
the intensive margin. Indeed, incontrast to traditional optimal tax problems,
the self selection constraints are binding from below in the sense that they
prevent low types from mimicing high types (rather than preventing high
types from mimicing low types).
As noted in lemma 14, more public spending reduces employment. In the
presence of search subsidies, this helps to alleviate excessive employment.
This side bene…t of higher public spending contains the marginal cost of
publicfunds. Indeed, expression(31) implies thatthemarginal costsof public
funds are below G(n1), its level in a model without a binding participation
constraint and without z = 0 bunching (see sub-sections 4.1 and 4.2).37
36Crucial for our result that marginal tax rates can be negative is that the government
can not freely set b to optimize social welfare. If the government could freely manipulate
the welfare bene…t b; it would increase it. In this way, it could redistribute resources to low
skilled agents without having to rely on in-work bene…ts that require low skilled agents to
engage in costly search.With inward migration, however, the government may …nd it hard
to a¤ect the outside option of migrants. Indeed, a government facing inward migration of
low-skilled labor may want to make the tax system less progressive compared to the case
in which it does not face the participation constraint of migrants. Moreover, the welfare
bene…t b may be set by another government agency than the tax authorities determining
labor taxes. The tax authorities may thus have to treat b as being exogenous.
37The …rst term at the right-hand side of (31),
G(n1)¡G(nw)
1¡F(nw) ; is declining in nw and thus
smaller than G(n1) if nw > n0: The second term is smaller than one if T(nw) + b < 0:
Hence, ‚E · G(n1): This inequity holds alsofor the case that the non-negativity constraint
396 Numerical simulations
The simulations assume that the government is utilitarian and that utility
from consumption is given by v(x) = 2x
1
2: Log productivity is distributed
according to atruncatednormal distributionwith amean of 3 and astandard
deviation of 0.5. The distribution is truncated at a maximum skill n1 of 100
and, in all simulations except the …rst one, at a minimum skill n0 of 4.
The various simulations assume di¤erent values for the government spending
requirement ¹ E; the welfare bene…t b; and search costs ￿:
In order to exclude bunching due to violation of monotonicity, we increase
the minimum skill n0 to 10, which is about half the median skill of 20.38 In
this case (see the …rst column of Table 1), the marginal tax rate rises rapidly
from zero at n0 = 10 to its maximum of about 19% close to the median skill,
after which it gradually declines to about 15% at the 95th percentile of the
skill distribution (at about n = 45). These marginal tax rates do not depend
on the spending requirement ¹ E ¸ 0; as z(n0) stays positive even at ¹ E = 0:
At zero public spending, u(n0) = 18:1 so that the participation margin does
not play a role as long as v(b) +￿ = 2b
1
2 + ￿ < 18:1:
If we adopt the benchmark minimum skill of n0 = 4; the monotonicity
requirement gives rise to bunching between the minimum skill of 4 and nb =
5:4 (see the second column of Table 1). The few agents with these few skills
feature a consumptionlevel x of10.8 and, with apublic spending requirement
¹ E of 120; gross incomes z of 1:8: In this case, the marginal tax rate starts
at a relatively high level close to 40% at nb = 5:4; after which it declines to
about 24% at the medium skill and 16% at the 95th percentile of the skill
distribution. The participation margin is not relevant as long as 2b
1
2 + ￿ <
u(n0) = 6:1:
Bunching on account of a binding monotonicity requirement is replaced
by z = 0 bunching if public spending is reduced to ¹ E = 25 while b = 10 and
￿ = 1 (see the third column of Table 1). The resulting ”American” economy
features low government spending and a low welfare bene…t. Skills below
nz = 10:5are notproductive and thus feature zerogross incomes: Hence, 10%
of the population that is not involuntarily unemployed does not provide any
work e¤ort. The marginal tax rate at nz amounts to 22%, after which it rises
on z(n) is binding.
38Such a high minimum skill can be justi…ed by assuming that the government sets
its gross minimum wage equal to this minimum skill n0 and provides disability bene…ts
to all agents featuring less skills than n0 = 10. This interpretation assumes that the
government can observe which workers have a skill level below n0 = 10: For the case
that the government can observe individual skills levels exactly, see Boone and Bovenberg
(2001).
40somewhat to a maximum of close to 25% at n = 15; before it declines again
to some 16% at the 95th percentile. The in-work bene…t at the marginal
skill level nz of ¡T(nz) = 68 compares to a tax payment T(n95%) = 255
corresponding to an average tax rate T(n95%)=z(n95%) of 15% at the 95th
percentile. A somewhat higher spending level ¹ E = 50 requires workers to
exert more work e¤ort, thereby reducing the non-productive part of the (non-
involuntarily unemployed) population to close to 6% as the marginal skill
level declines to nz = 9:4 (see the fourth column of Table 1).
By increasing not only the spending level to ¹ E = 50 but also the welfare
bene…t to b = 40; we arrive at our benchmark case (see the …rst column of
Table 2). This case features a binding participation margin with voluntary
unemployment. Inparticular, skills n < nw = 11:1 do notsearch for a job but
rathercollectthewelfare bene…t, implyingthat12 %ofthe (non-involuntarily
unemployed) population does not enter the labor force. The marginal tax
rate at the wage ‡oor nw amounts to 15%, reaching a maximum of 21% near
the median, before gradually declining to 16% at the 95th percentile. The
average tax rate increases from just below zero at the marginal worker nw to
15% at the 95th percentile.
Raising public spending or the welfare bene…t further, we produce a ”Eu-
ropean” economy featuring high spending and welfare levels. To illustrate, if
we increase the welfare bene…t to b = 70; about half of the population does
not enter the labor force (see the second column of Table 2). In this case,
the marginal tax rate at the marginal skill level nw amounts to 43%. At the
95th percentile, the marginal rate is 21%. With a more heavily distorted
participation margin and lower employment, a larger part of the spending
requirement must be …nanced by the higher skills. Indeed, the 95th per-
centile skill level now faces an average tax rate close to 25%. Raising public
spending to ¹ E = 100 while leaving the welfare bene…t b at 40, we …nd that
marginal tax rates approach 50% at the e¤ective minimum wage nw = 17:6
(see the third column of Table 2)
Search is subsidized if both public spending and the welfare bene…t are
quite low at respectively ¹ E = 25 and b = 10; while search costs are large at
￿ = 10 (see the fourth column of Table 2).39 The substantial search costs
yield a high wage ‡oor of nw = 15:4: At the same time, low public spending
and welfare bene…ts imply that the government subsidizes search at a rate of
about 2% (i.e. (T(nw)+b)=z(nw) = ¡:02): The marginal tax rate rises from
this level to a maximum of 13% around a skill level of 35.
39This case is similar in all respects to the U.S. economy discussed above, except that
search costs are considerably larger. These larger search costs cause agents to stop working
on the extensive rather than the intensive margin. In both cases, however, the government
provides search subsidies to marginal workers.
41The case with a binding participation margin but without any involun-
tary unemployment emerges at high spending levels ¹ E = 150 and low search
costs and welfare bene…ts. In the absence of a participation margin, the least
skill agents would feature negative utility levels u(4) = ¡1:36: Hence, even
without search costs and a welfare bene…t (i.e. b = ￿ = 0), the participation
margin is binding (see the last column of Table 2).40 Hence, the marginal
costs of public funds increases beyond G(n1) = 0:056: This eliminates bunch-
ing due to a binding monotonicity requirement and lifts the marginal tax rate
at the bottom to over 60%. In this case, therefore, just as in the …rst simu-
lation in which we raised n0 to 10; bunching is eliminated altogether and the
agents featuring the least skills thus exert positive work e¤ort.
We also consider the benchmark case with a non-utilitarian government






tdt to skill n. This simula-
tion (see the last column of Table 1) shows that, ceteris paribus the welfare
bene…t, a more egalitarian government lowers unemployment. Intuitively,
such a government is willing to spend more resources on active labor-market
policies for the low skilled. In fact, in-work bene…ts are so generous that all
agents search, even though the least productive 16% of the population does
not produce anything in their jobs.
7 Conclusions
This paper has exploredhowthe incometax systemshould optimally respond
to an exogenously given welfare system in the presence of costly labor-market
search and non-veri…able skills. We showed that optimal unemployment is
determined by the requirement that distortions on the external margin bal-
ance those on the intensive margin. On the one hand, generous in-work
bene…ts help to alleviate distortions on the participation margin by encour-
aging more low-skilled workers to actively look for work. On the other hand,
such bene…ts make it more attractive for high-ability agents to mimic lower
ability agents, thereby distorting work e¤ort. The government thus faces a
trade-o¤ between boosting (low productive) employment and raising work
e¤ort of higher skilled workers. When the government lacks information on
individual skills, a distorted participation margin is therefore the price for
40Another way to arrive at this case without dramatically raising public spending and
reducing b and ￿ is to increase n0: To illustrate, we arrived at this case by combining
n0 = 7:5 and ￿ = 1 with European spending levels ¹ E = 100 and American welfare levels
b = 10: In this case, the increase in ‚E was not su¢cient to eliminate bunching on account
of violation of monotonicity. For the relevant equations in this case, see Lemma in the
appendix.
42combatting poverty while at the same time protecting labor supply of higher
skilled workers. A similar trade-o¤ appears in determining an optimal retire-
ment scheme. In particular, rather than linking public retirement bene…ts
to the retirement age in an actuarially fair way, the government may want
to favor early retirement to aid low productivity individuals su¤ering from
poor health (see also Cremer, Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2002)).
In the presence of low search costs, low welfare bene…ts, a concentrated
skill distribution and large public spending, the government may …nd it opti-
mal to employ a progressive tax system providing generous in-work bene…ts
to low-skilled workers in order to induce all agents to search. Such a progres-
sive tax system features a positive marginal tax rate at the bottom. This
contrasts with the familiar result from the optimal tax literature that, in
the absence of bunching at the bottom, those with the lowest skills should
face a zero marginal tax rate (see Seade (1977)). This new result shows that
the welfare system and the participation margin may importantly a¤ect the
optimal tax system.
Social assistance and positive search costs may overturn also the well-
known result from the optimal tax literature that marginal taxes should be
positive in the interior of the income distribution. We showed that the gov-
ernment may optimally increasein-work bene…tswith gross income (implying
a negative marginal tax on work e¤ort) in order to limit excessive entry into
the labor market. In particular, whereas positive marginal tax rates at the
bottom help to encourage search if labor-force participation of low-skilled
workers is taxed on a net basis, negative marginal taxes rates for low-skilled
workers help to discourage excessive entry of low-skilled workers if this entry
is subsidized. This latter case provides a rationale also for minimum wages
and hiring and …ring costs.
The incorporation of labor-market imperfections and the welfare system
into a model of optimal non-linear income taxation enabled us to investigate
how these new elements impact the optimal income tax. We showed, for
example, that lower search costs allow the government to cut marginal taxes
throughout the skill distribution. In this way, active labor-market policies
that enhance the ‡exibility of the labor market alleviate distortions on the
intensive margin of labor supply. More generous welfare bene…ts, in contrast,
tend to raise marginal tax rates, as the government cuts the average tax
burden onlow-skilledworkers in order toencourage these workers to continue
to look for a job. Accordingly, skilled workers …nance not only more generous
social assistance, but also a lower tax burden of low-skilled workers.
As a benchmark case for the main contribution of this paper, namely
the introduction of a binding participation margin in a model of optimal in-
come taxation, we elaborated on the case in which agents stop working on
43the intensive margin by reducing their work e¤ort to zero. The comparative
static results for this case help to show how a binding participation mar-
gin alters the constraints faced by a government setting its tax policy. To
illustrate, the employment response to higher welfare bene…ts depends cru-
cially on whether or not the participation margin is binding. If it is not, the
adverse income e¤ects associated with higher taxation on account of higher
welfare discourage more agents from exiting the labor market through the
intensive margin. With a binding participation margin, in contrast, higher
welfare bene…ts induce additional agents to leave the labor market through
the extensive margin.
In future research, we would like to investigate optimal tax policy if the
government can simultaneously set welfare bene…ts, search obligations, and
other categorical social insurance bene…ts (such as disability bene…ts based
on a signal of skill type). A study of these issues would need to allow for im-
perfect information on search behavior, household structure, and skill types.
In exploring the optimal trade-o¤ between passive welfare bene…ts and ac-
tive labor-market policies, we also would like to account for negative external
e¤ects of unemployment.
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9 Appendix: proofs of results
9.1 Preliminary results
The dynamic optimization problems in this paper are not standard. In par-
ticular, section 5 includes the constraint u(nw) ¸ v(b) + ￿; where both the
function u(:) and the type nw are endogenous. Similarly, section 4.3 features
the constraint z(nz) ¸ 0; where bothz (:) andnz are endogenous. Sincestan-
dard references as Kamien and Schwartz (1981) do not provide the necessary
conditions for these problems, we derive the required lemma ourselves. The
lemma below provides the necessary conditions for the optimality of u(:);
which can be readily adapted to obtain the optimality of z(:).






L(n;u(n); _ u(n))dn + ª(nw;uw);
where uw ´ u(nw) is the starting value for u(:) at nw, and




















½ ¹ F (nw)v(b) +
£
1 ¡ ¹ F (nw)
¤
(¡￿¹ s +(1 ¡ ¹ s)v(b))+
¡‚E[F (nw)+ (1¡ F (nw))(1 ¡ ¹ s)]b¡ ·w (￿ ¡ uw + v(b))
¾
:
46Hence, we …nd for this particular optimization problem







L_ u = ¡‚u(n);
ªuw = ·w;
ªnw = f (nw) ¹ s[￿ + v(b) ¡ ‚Eb];
L(nw) = ¹ su(nw)f(nw)`(nw) + ‚Ef(nw)¹ sT (nw):
Substituting these expressions into the following lemma, we obtain the nec-
essary conditions in this appendix.









L(n;u(n); _ u(n))dn + ª(nw;uw);
where u(n1) and uw are free, n1 is exogenously …xed and nw can be chosen





L_ u(n1) = 0;
ªuw ¡ L_ u(nw) = 0;
ªnw + L_ u(nw) _ u(nw) ¡ L(nw) = 0 if nw > n0;
[ªnw + L_ u(nw) _ u(nw)¡ L(nw)]nw=n0 · 0 if nw = n0;
where Lu (L_ u) denotes the derivative of the function L(n;u; _ u) with respect
to u (_ u) and Lu(n) (L_ u(n)) denotes this derivative evaluated at the point n.




















w ¸ n0 solve the maximization problem above, the function g(:)
reaches a maximum at a = 0 for each admissable combination of h(:);–n
and –u. Taking the derivative of g(:) with respect to a and evaluating it at























47Through integration by parts, we …nd
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–n = –u = h(n1) = h(nw) = 0 yields an admissable alternative function.







































Also –n = –u = h(nw) = 0 yields an admissable alternative function. Since
u(n1) is free so that h(n1) can be both positive and negative, it must be the
case that
L_ u(n1) = 0:
























Note that the relationship between –u;–n and h(:) is
–u = h(n
¤
w) + _ u(n
¤
w)–n:
This can be seen as follows
a–u = u(n
¤
















where a …rst-order Taylor expansion yields the second line, while the third
line follows from the de…nition of h(:). Substitution of this relation into the




















48–n = 0 yields an admissable alternative. Since u(nw) is free and –u can







w) ¡ L_ u(n
¤
w) = 0:











Here we face two possibilities. First, if n¤










w = n0, the only admissable values for –n are nonnegative (for











because otherwise one would optimally select nw > n0; contradicting the
optimality of n¤
w = n0.
9.2 Proofs of results in section 3
Proof of lemma 1
We write








and note that incentive compatibility implies
u(x(n);z(n);n)¡ u(x(m);z(m);n) ¸ 0
for each n 2 [n0;n1] and each m 2 [n0;n1].
We look at the di¤erence u(x(n);z(n);n) ¡ u(x(m);z(m);n) in two dif-
ferent ways. First, we …x n and let m vary and de…ne
g(m) = fu(x(n);z(n);n) ¡ u(x(m);z(m);n)g:
The consumption and gross income schedules x(:) and z(:) (and thereby the
tax schedule T(z(n))) satisfy incentive compatibility, if an agent of type n
…nds it optimal to report m = n. That is, the function g(:) has a minimum




zz0(m)]m=n = 0; (32)
where u0
x = v0(x(m)) > 0 and u0
z = ¡ 1
n < 0. This equation implies that
z0 (n) = 0 if and only if x0(n) = 0.
Now …x m and let n vary and de…ne the function ~ g(:) as
~ g(n) = fu(x(n);z(n);n)¡ u(x(m);z(m);n)g:
This function achieves a minimum at n = m. The …rst-order condition for











at n = m. The second-order condition for the minimization of ~ g(:) evaluated




It follows from this condition that z0(n) ¸ 0. Using equation (32), we …nd
that also x0(n) ¸ 0.
In order to prove that the conditions in the lemma also guarantee that
the second-order condition holds globally, we use a proof by contradiction.41
So suppose this is not the case. In particular, assume that there exist two
















































41This proof follows closely the argument by Guesnerie and La¤ont (1984).
42The proof for the case where n0 < n is similar to the one given here.











However, this contradicts the inequality with which we started this proof.
Hence, there cannot be two types n and n0 such that u(x(n0);z(n0);n) >
u(x(n);z(n);n). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
The statement in the lemma can be rephrased as follows. If ￿ > 0 then
z(nw) = 0 implies u(nw) > v(b) + ￿, that is the participation margin is not
binding. The …rst-order condition for nw in maximization problem (7) can
be written as
·wu
0(nw) · f (nw) ¹ s[(¡￿ ¡ v(b)+ u(nw))`(nw) +‚E (b+ T (nw))];
where the inequality can be strict only if nw = n0. Now assume (by contra-
diction) that not only z(nw) = 0 but also u(nw) = v(b) + ￿: The …rst-order




0 · f (nw)¹ s‚E(b +T (nw))
so that ¡T (nw) · b. With z(nw) = 0; ¡T(nw) = x(nw) and v(x(nw) =
u(nw)so that ¡T (nw) · b implies u(nw) · v(b): This contradicts the binding
participation margin v(x(nw)) = u(nw) = v(b) + ￿ if ￿ > 0. Q.E.D.
9.3 Proofs of results in section 4
Proof of lemma 4
The …rst-order conditions (Euler equations) for optimizing (7) with re-














z (n) = ¡
‚u(n)







together with the transversality conditions
‚u(n0) = ‚u(n1) = 0;
‚z (n0) = ‚z (n1) = 0;
51and the government budget constraint (6).
Since by assumption ‚z (n) = 0 and thus ‚
0








‚Ef (n) ¹ s
: (36)
The …rst-order condition for maximizing individual utility with respect to
z (n) in equation (2) amounts to
v0
³
z(n)¡ ~ T (z (n))
´³












Using this in equation (36) to eliminate v0 (x(n)); we …nd
¿(n) =
¡‚u(n)
‚En2f (n) ¹ s
: (37)






‚u(n)+ ‚E¹ sf (n)n ¡ ¹ sf (n)`(n) (38)
This is a linear di¤erential equation that can be solved analytically (using
















for some constant c0. The transversality condition ‚u(n0) = 0 yields c0 = 0
so that
‚u(n) = n¹ s[‚EF (n)¡ G(n)]: (40)
The transversality condition ‚u(n1) = 0 implies
‚E = G(n1):




G(n1) ¡ F (n)
nf (n)
:
The de…nition of u(n) allows us to write
z (n) = n(v(x(n))¡ u(n)): (41)
52To determine what u(n)looks like, wesubstitute this expression for z (n) into
the incentive compatibility constraint u0(n) =
z(n)





















for some constant K. To determine K; we substitute (42) into (41) and





f[tv(x(t)) ¡ x(t)]f (t)¡ [1¡ F (t)]v(x(t))gdt:
Finally, the expressionfor W in the lemmacan be derived by writing indi-








substitutethisexpression intowelfare W = ¡￿¹ s+(1 ¡ ¹ s)v(b)+
R n1
n0 ¹ sf (n)`(n)u(n)dn
to eliminate u(n); and employ partial integration. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5





‚E + f (n)n ¡ [1¡ F (n)]
(43)
where ‚E = G(n1). This solution yields a path for consumption x which is


























53What does the optimal solution look like if x0(n0) < 0? The main departure
from the proof of lemma 4 is that ‚z (n) < 0 for n close to n0 so that the
optimal !(n) determined by equation (33) equals !(n) = z0(n) = 0 for
these types. Lemma 1 then implies that also x0(n) = 0 for these types.
Accordingly, types [n0;nb] are bunched together.
Equations (33), (34), (35) and the transversality conditions still apply.
Moreover, the analysis in the proof of lemma 4 is correct for non-bunched
types n ¸ nb: Todetermine the size ofthe bunching interval and themarginal
cost of public funds, we derive two equations in nb and ‚E: The …rst equation
is found by integrating (34) and using the transversality conditions ‚u(n0) =
‚u(n1) = 0 to arrive at


































v0(x(n))dn by using equation (43)












1¡ ¹ F (nb)
¤¤
¡ nbF (nb)+ nb:
Step B. Combining this with the observation that v0(xb) = v0(x(nb)) and





















1 ¡ ¹ F (nb)
¤
¸
+nb ¡ F (nb)
1 ¡ F (nb)
f (nb)
:
Step C. Substituting this into the denominator of equation (44) and solv-
ing for ‚E; we arrive at (45).
The second relationship between ‚E and nb follows from the transversal-
ity condition ‚z (n0) = 0 and the de…nition of nb as the end of the bunching
interval: ‚z (n) = 0 for all n ¸ nb (while ‚z (n) < 0 for n 2 hn0;nbi):




















We solve ‚u(n) for n < nb by integrating (34) and employing the transver-
sality condition ‚u(n0) = 0 :






























n dn ¡ ‚E¹ sF (nb)
)
= 0:
Using (43) for n = nb to eliminate v0(xb) and solving for ‚E; we arrive at the
second relation between ‚E and nb
‚E =




F(nb) ¹ F (nb)
1 ¡ F (nb)
: (46)
Equating the two expressions ((45) and (46)) for ‚E, we …nd (16) deter-
mining nb in the lemma. Substituting equation (16) into either (45) or (46),
we arrive at ‚E = G(n1). We …nd the equation determining z (n) in the
same way as in the proof of lemma 4, taking into account that x(n) = xb for
n 2 [n0;nb]. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6
d‚E
d ¹ E = 0 follows immediately from the result that ‚E = G(n1). Since
¹ E does not impact ‚E; consumption x(:) (which is determined by (17))
is not a¤ected by ¹ E. (16) shows that nb is determined completely by the
distribution of skills and the rank order weights `(:) and is thus not a¤ected
by ¹ E so that
dnb
d ¹ E = 0. Finally, the equation for z(:) in lemma 5 (taking
the previous results into account) implies that
dz(n)
d ¹ E = 1 for all n 2 [n0;n1].
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 7
The main departure from the proof of lemma 4 is that the transversality
condition for z (n0) is now changed to ‚z (n0) < 0. The reason is that (by
assumption) the restriction z (n0) ¸ 0 is binding. In other words, one would
55like to reduce z(n0) in order to raise welfare (which is exactly what ‚z (n0) <
0 implies) but is prevented from doing so by the restriction z(n0) ¸ 0.
Together with equation (35), ‚z (n0) < 0 implies that there exists nz > n0
suchthat ‚z (n) < 0 for all n 2 [n0;nzi. Hence, the optimal !(n) determined
by equation (33) equals !(n) = z0(n) = 0 for n 2 [n0;nzi. Lemma 1 then
implies that also x0(n) = 0 for these types so that types n 2 [n0;nz] are
bunched together with z (n) = 0.
The other conditions for optimality are similar to the ones in the proof
of lemma 4. In particular, equations (33), (34) and (35) together with the
transversality conditions ‚z (n1) = ‚u(n0) = ‚u(n1) = 0 continue to apply.
Indeed, the analysis in the proof of lemma 4 is correct for types n ¸ nz. The
main di¤erence with the proof of lemma 4 is that we derive two equations in
nz and ‚E to determine the size of the bunching interval and the marginal
cost of public funds.
The …rst relationship is found by solving equation (38) starting from the
endpoint n1 and using ‚u(n1) = 0
‚u+(n) = ¡n¹ s[‚E(1¡ F (n))¡ (G(n1)¡ G(n))] (47)
for all n 2 [nz;n1]: The + in ‚u+ indicates that it is the solution for ‚u
from above nz. Solving equation (34) starting from n0 using ‚u(n0) = 0 and
taking into account that x(n) = xz for n · nz; we …nd





¡ ¹ F (n)
¸
(48)




¡ ¹ F (nz) = ¡nz‚E(1¡ F (nz)) +nz (G(n1) ¡ G(nz));
which can be rewritten as equation (18) in the lemma.
As in the proof of lemma 5, consumption x(n) for n ¸ nz is determined
by equation (43). By thus solving the path for x(:) from above, we observe
that xz = x(nz) because !(n) = 0 for n · nz implies that consumption does
not fall further. Substituting (43) for n = nz to eliminate v0(xz) from (18)
and solving for ‚E; we arrive at the …rst relation between nz and ‚E
43
‚E =











43Note the similarity with equation (45) above, which also follows from the condition
that ‚u (n) is continuous at the end of the bunching interval.
56The second relation between nz and ‚E follows from the government









(from (42)) into (41) to eliminate u(n);
we obtain




To solve for Kz; we employ (6), which can here be written as (using T(n) =











dn = ¹ E:
By integrating by parts, we rewrite this equation as
(1 ¡ F (nz))
¡
Kz ¡ ¹ E
¢




f (n)[nv(x(n)) ¡ x(n)]





Kz ¡ ¹ E
¢
into equation(50) andusing z(nz) =
0, we arrive at the second relation between nzand ‚E; namely equation (19)
in the lemma.
The next two lemmas derive some properties of the two equations (18)
(or equivalently (49)) and (19).
Lemma 18 Equation (18) in (nz;‚E) space has the following properties:






¨ it is downward sloping for all nz 2 [n0;n1] if x(n) as determined by
equation (17) is increasing in n and the distribution of skills satis…es the
monotone hazard rate property (20),
¨ a point (nz;‚E) with ‚E > G(n1) cannot be part of a solution to the
optimization problem (8) because it violates monotonicity for n ¸ nz.
Proof. ¨ Substitution of nz = n0 in (18) yields
‚E =
0 +(n0¡ 0)(G(n1)¡ 0)
n0¡ 0
= G(n1):













Since G(n1) > 1
n1; this curve must be downward sloping over parts of the
57range [n0;n1].
¨ Note that (from (47)) ‚u+(n0) = n0(G(n1)¡ ‚E): Hence, ‚u+(:) can be
written as (from (34))










where x(t) is determined by (43).











A point (nz;‚E) on curve (18) satis…es
‚u+(nz;‚E) = ‚u¡(nz;nz;‚E);

































































































dnz < 0 if x0 (n) > 0 for all n and if the denominator is positive for
all n, that is n ¡ F (n)
1¡F(n)
f(n) > 0 for all n. To see that the latter condition
follows from condition (20) note that
n0 ¡ F (n0)
1¡ F (n0)
f (n0)
= n0 > 0










for all n. Hence it follows that n ¡ F (n)
1¡F(n)
f(n) > 0 for all n 2 [n0;n1].
¨ Consider a point (nz;‚E) with ‚E > G(n1). Then continuity of (49)
implies that a point (n0
z;‚
0
E) exists such that n0
z > nz and ‚
0
E > G(n1);
which implies (from (47)) that ‚u+(n0;‚
0
E) < 0: Since ‚u¡(n0;nz;‚E) = 0;


























z close enough to nz, this inequality implies x0(nz) < 0 where




E is close to ‚E and x(n) (as determined
by equation (17)) is continuous in ‚E, we must have
x
0 (nz) < 0
evaluated at ‚E. Therefore, a point (nz;‚E) with ‚E > G(n1) implies that
monotonicity of x(:) is violated for n ¸ nz and thus cannot be part of a
solution to (8).





ff (n)[nv(x(n)) ¡x(n)] ¡ [1¡ F (n)]v(x(n))gdn
¡
£
(1 ¡ F (nz))nzv(x(nz))+ ¹ E + F (nz)x(nz)
¤
:
59(19) can be written as ˆ(nz;‚E) = 0. It is routine to verify
ˆnz (nz;‚E) = ¡x
0 (nz)
nzf (nz) + F (nz)
h
G(n1)¡G(nz)
‚E ¡ (1¡ F (nz))
i
G(n1)¡G(nz)




nz f[tv0(x(t))¡ 1]f (t)¡ [1¡ F (t)]v0(x(t))g
dx(t)
d‚E dt






nz fv0(x(t))(tf (t) ¡[1¡ F (t)]) ¡ f (t)g
dx(t)
d‚E dt








































We thus have two curves in (nz;‚E) space. Assuming that condition (20)
holds, we can identify four possible cases:
1. The curve (19) lies everywhere below the curve (18) in (nz;‚E) space,
2. the curve (19) lies everywhere above the curve (18) in (nz;‚E) space,
3. the curve (19) crosses the curve (18) at a point where (19) is upward
sloping and (18) downward sloping and ‚E · G(n1).
4. the curve (19) crosses the curve (18) at a point (nz;‚E) where x0 (nz) <
0.
In case 1, E is so low (probably negative) that no one needs to work in
this economy.
In case 2, the solution in lemma 4 implies z(n0) > 0. This can be seen
as follows. If instead of deriving equation (19) with z (nz) = 0; we derive an
equation with z (nz) = ¹ z > 0, the curve (19) shifts downwards and hence we
…nd a point of intersection between (19) and (18) where z (n0) = ¹ z > 0.
In case 3, the intersection point determines the equilibrium values of nz
and ‚E.
In case 4, the point (nz;‚E) is not an equilibrium point. x0(nz) < 0
implies that ‚z (nz) < 0 and hence types slightly above nz should be bunched
together with type nz with the same consumption and production (!(n) = 0
60for these types). Sincez (nz) = 0; the z = 0bunchinginterval thenextends to
types n > nz beyond nz. In this case, the procedure to …nd an equilibrium
is as follows. Extend the bunching interval to the smallest value ~ nz > nz
such that x0(~ nz) ¸ 0. If this point (~ nz;‚E) satis…es the government budget
constraint (19), it is the solution to the maximization problem. If it does not
satisfy the government budget constraint, there are two possibilities. First,
the solution (~ nz;‚E) may be too expensive to be an equilibrium. Then the
solution will feature z(n) = ¹ z > 0 for n 2 [n0;nz] so that z = 0 bunching
does not occur. Second, the solution (~ nz;‚E) may leave government money
on the table. In that case, the bunching interval should be extended beyond
~ nz.
Finally, we need to prove that ¿ (nz) > 0. (37) implies that ¿ (nz) > 0
if and only if ‚u(nz) < 0. Hence, the proof boils down to showing that
‚u+(nz;‚E) < 0 if ‚u+ (nz;‚E) = ‚u¡ (nz;nz;‚E): Suppose (by contradic-
tion) that ‚u+(nz;‚E) > 0. Then ‚u+(n;‚E) is decreasing in n at nz because








only once (from negative to positive) as a function of n (since x0 (n) ¸ 0 and
`
0 (n) · 0). Hence,
‚E
v0 (x(nz))
¡ `(nz) < 0 (53)
Next observe that ‚u¡(n0;nz;‚E) = 0 together with ‚u¡(nz;nz;‚E) > 0
implies that
‚E
v0(x(nz)) ¡ `(n) > 0 for some n · nz. `
0(n) · 0 implies in
fact that
‚E
v0(x(nz)) ¡ `(nz) > 0; which contradicts inequality (53). Hence,
‚u+(nz;‚E) = ‚u¡(nz;nz;‚E) < 0 and thus ¿ (nz) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 8
As established in the proof of lemma 7, we must have that x0 (nz) > 0 so
that nz and ‚E are determined by the intersection of the downward sloping
curve (18) and the upward sloping curve (19). Clearly, equation (18) is not
a¤ected by a change in ¹ E. The proof of lemma 19 implies that (19) shifts
upward (and to the left) as ¹ E increases. Hence, nz falls and ‚E rises with ¹ E:
Since ‚E reduces x(nz) and we have x0 (nz) ¸ 0 and dnz=d¹ E < 0; we …nd
that xz = x(nz) falls with ¹ E: Furthermore, (17) implies that the rise in ‚E
raises the marginal tax rate and reduces consumption for all types n > nz.










we …nd that utility declines with ¹ E for all n > nz. Finally, the tax paid by
61type n can be written as









since z (n) = 0 for all n 2 [n0;nz]. Hence, dxz
d¹ E < 0 implies that a value




for all n 2 [nz;n¤i. Q.E.D.
9.4 Proofs of results in section 5
The main text focuses on one type of bunching at the time. The next lemma
considerspossible combinations ofbunching. In particular, it excludes several
bunching combinationsandprovidesthe necessary conditions for anoptimum
in the other cases not considered in the main text.
The second-order condition z0(n) ¸ 0 implies that z (n) ¸ 0 is satis…ed
for all n > nw if it is met for nw. We therefore have to add only the con-





¹ F (nw)v(b) +
£
1¡ ¹ F (nw)
¤











¡‚z (n)[z0 (n) ¡ !(n)] + ‚E[f(n)¹ sT(n)]
)
dn
¡‚Efb[F (nw) +(1 ¡ F (nw))(1¡ ¹ s)] +Eg
¡·w (￿ ¡ u(nw)+ v(b))+ –wz(nw)
Lemma 20 Based on the values for the Lagrange multipliers ·w;–w = –(nw)
and ‚z (nw); we can distinguish the following cases:
·w < 0 ·w = 0 ·w > 0
–w > 0 –w = 0 –w > 0 –w = 0 –w > 0 –w = 0
‚z (n) = 0 ; A ‚z = 0 ; C ‚z = 0 ; F
‚z (n) < 0* ; B ‚z < 0 D E ‚z < 0 ; G
* In particular we focus on the case where ‚z (n) < 0 for n close to nw
The cases denoted by ; can be excluded, while the cases B and G are not con-
sidered in the main text. The equations characterizing the solution in these
62latter two cases are as follows. As in propositions 9 and 12, nw is the lowest
type with positive search e¤ort. In addition to that, a type nb exists such that
x(n) = x(nb)
for all n 2 [nw;nb]; where x(:) is determined by equation (17) for all n ¸ nb.
The equations determining u(:) and z (:) are the same as those in proposition
12, with x(:) being constant over the range [nw;nb].




































n0 f[tv(xb) ¡ xb]f (t) ¡ [1¡ F (t)]v(xb)gdt+ Rn1
nb f[tv(x(t)) ¡ x(t)]f (t)¡ [1¡ F (t)]v(x(t))gdt
¾
= n0(v(b) + ￿)+ ¹ E;
where ‚u(n) is determined by equation (54).
If nw > n0, xw is determined by (25) and the endogenous variables nb;nw;‚E


















































f[tv(xw) ¡ xw]f (t)¡ [1¡ F (t)]v(xw)gdt+
Z n1
nb
f[tv(x(t)) ¡ x(t)]f (t) ¡[1¡ F (t)]v(x(t))gdt;
where ‚u(n) is determined by equation (54).
Proof
63Lemma 3 implies that ·w 6= 0 cannot go together with –w > 0 (i.e.
z (nw) ¸ 0 is a binding constraint). Furthermore, using lemma 17 in the
appendix, the transversality condition for z(:) at nw (satisfying z (nw) ¸ 0)
can be written as
‚z (nw) +–w = 0:
–w > 0 thus excludes ‚z (nw) = 0.
The derivation for the necessary conditions for optimality follows largely
the derivations in the proofs of propositions 9 and 12. More precisely, the
…rst-orderconditions(or Euler equations) fornw;u(:);z (:) and!(:)coincide.
The di¤erence is that in cases B and G, ‚z (n) < 0 around nw so that !(n) =
0 around nw. In particular, there exists nb > nw such that !(n) = 0 for all
n 2 [n0;nb]. nb is determined as follows. Since the transversality condition
impliesthat ‚z (nw) = 0 andsince (by de…nition) nb is theendofthebunching





z (n)dn = 0:













Solving for ‚u(n) by integrating equation (34) and taking into account that
x(n) is constant over the range [nw;nb] and the transversality condition

























where ·w = ·0 and xw = xb if nw = n0.
‚u(n) can be solved also from n1, which yields the solution given by (54).











where ‚u(nb) is determined by (54) and ·w = ·0;xw = xb if nw = n0.
64Finally, the government budget constraint needs to be satis…ed, which
can be written as












f[tv(xw) ¡ xw]f (t)¡ [1¡ F (t)]v(xw)gdt+
Z n1
nb
f[tv(x(t)) ¡ x(t)]f (t) ¡[1¡ F (t)]v(x(t))gdt;
where xw = xb if nw = n0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9
Since the optimal value for nw is the corner solution nw = n0; the …rst-
order condition for optimizing (7) with respect to nw (evaluated at nw = n0)
amounts to
·0u
0 (n0) · f (n0) ¹ s‚E(b+ T (n0));
whichyieldsthe…rst inequalityin(21). The optimalityconditionsfor!(:);u(:)
andz (:) arethe sameas equations (33), (34) and(35). Weknowfrom Lemma
2 that z (n0) > 0 if the participation constraint is binding (and ￿ > 0), which
establishes the …rst inequity in the proposition. Furthermore, z (n0) > 0 im-
plies that the transversality conditions for z (:) are
‚z (n0) = ‚z (n1) = 0:
Using the adjusted transversality condition derived in lemma 17 for u(:) at
nw = n0; we obtain
‚u(n0)+ ·0 = 0;
‚u(n1) = 0:
The government would like to reduce u(n0); but is prevented from doing so
because of the constraint u(n0) ¸ v(b) +￿: Hence, ‚u(n0) < 0 and ·0 > 0.
The latter inequity and u0(n0) =
z(n0)
n2
0 > 0 imply the second inequality in
(21).
Alsohere, thedi¤erential equation determining ‚u(n) is given by equation
(38) (since ‚z (n) = 0 and thus ‚
0
z (n) = 0 for all n): By using ‚u(n1) = 0,
we can solve this di¤erential equation as
‚u(n) = ¡n¹ s[‚E(1¡ F (n))¡ (G(n1) ¡G(n))]: (54)
Substituting this solution into (36), we arrive at (17).
65‚u(n0) = ¡·0 < 0 and (54) (for n = n0) imply that
n0¹ s[‚E ¡ G(n1)] = ·0 > 0; (55)
so that ‚E > G(n1).
As above, ¿ (n) is determinedby (37), hence (employing the transversality






which establishes the second inequality in (22). Using equation (21), this can













where we have used incentive compatibility u0(n0) =
z(n0)
n2
0 to eliminate u0(n0)
from the inequality.
Substituting ·0 = ¿ (n0)‚En2
0f (n0)¹ s (see the previous equation) to elim-
inate ·0 from (55), we arrive at
‚E(1 ¡ n0f (n0)¿ (n0)) = G(n1);
which yields the equality in (23).
Finally, the expression for welfare W follows from substituting u(n0) =
v(b)+ ￿ into (14). Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 10 and lemma 11
Since nw = n0 is a corner solution, marginal changes in ¹ E and ￿ do not
a¤ect nw: We prove d‚E
d¹ E ; d‚E
d￿ > 0 by contradiction. Suppose that d‚E
d ¹ E ; d‚E
d￿ <
0. u(n0) = v(b) +￿ implies that n0 does not lose (if E increases) and gains
(ifb or ￿ increase). (17) and
d‚E
d ¹ E ;
d‚E




d￿ > 0 for all n > n0.










we …nd that all types n > n0 gain if ¹ E; b; or ￿ rise. This Pareto improvement






d ¹ E > 0 implies (from (17))
dx(n)
d ¹ E < 0 andthus (fromv0(x(n)) = 1
n(1¡¿(n)))
d¿(n)
d ¹ E > 0 for all n ¸ n0.
66Since u(n0) = v(x(n0) ¡z(n0)=n0;
dx(n0)
d ¹ E < 0 and
du(n0)
d¹ E ¸ 0 yield
dz(n0)
d ¹ E <
0. Writing
du(n0)











we …nd that v0 (n0) > 1











Finally, in order to derive the sign of
du(n1)
d¹ E we write
du(n)




















d ¹ E > 0 would imply
du(n)
d¹ E > 0 for all n ¸ n0; thereby contradicting the
optimality of the original solution paths. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 12
With an interior solution nw > n0; the …rst-order condition for maximiz-
ing (7) with respect to nw amounts to
·wu
0 (nw) = f (nw)f¹ s[¡￿ ¡ v(b) +u(nw) + ‚E(b +T(nw))]g: (56)
The transversality conditions are
‚u(nw)+ ·w = 0; (57)
‚u(n1) = 0; (58)
‚z (nw) = 0; (59)
‚z (n1) = 0: (60)
The …rst transversality condition follows from lemma 17 while z(nw) > 0 (see
lemma 3) yields the third transversality condition. The second transversal-
ity condition implies that di¤erential equation (38) for ‚u(n) can be solved
as (54), which implies (together with (36)) that (17) holds. Solving this
expression for ‚E; we arrive at (26).





+ ¹ s[‚E(1¡ F (nw))¡ (G(n1)¡ G(nw))] = 0: (61)
We know from 2 that an interior solution nw > n0 implies u(nw) = v(b)+￿,
so that we can write (56) as
·w =
f (nw)¹ s‚E(b+ T (nw))
u0 (nw)
: (62)
Substituting (57) into (37) to eliminate ‚u(nw) and using (62) to eliminate













the second expression. Since v0(xw) = 1







z (nw) ¡ b¡ T (nw)
=
v(xw) ¡ ￿ ¡ v(b)
xw ¡ b
; (64)
where we have used (from the binding participation constraint) z (nw) =
nw (v(xw) ¡ u(nw)) = nw(v(xw) ¡ v(b) ¡ ￿) and T (nw) = z (nw) ¡ xw to
eliminate z(nw) and T(nw) from the …rst equality in (64). To see that xw is
uniquely de…ned, we write (25) as
¡v0(xw)b+ v(b) +￿ = v(xw) ¡ xwv0(xw):
At xw = b; the left-hand side exceeds the right-hand side. Furthermore, as
x ! +1; the right-handsideexceeds the left-handsidebecauselimx!+1v(x)¡
xv0 (x) = +1 and v00(x) < 0. Hence, a value ^ xw > b exists so that (25)
holds. This value is unique because for xw > b the slope of the right-hand
side (¡v00 (xw)xw > 0) exceeds that of the left-hand side (¡v00(xw)b > 0).





















z(nw) and we have used incentive compatibility u0(nw) =
z(nw)
n2
w to eliminate u0 (nw):
The government budget constraint is given by
Z n1
nw
f(n)¹ s[z(n) ¡ x(n)]dn = E + [F (nw) + (1¡ F (nw))(1 ¡ ¹ s)]b: (66)




















nw f[tv(x(t)) ¡ x(t)]f (t) ¡[1¡ F (t)]v(x(t))gdt
¡bF (nw)¡ ¹ E
¸
:
Using(67), u(nw) = v(b)+￿ canbe writtenas
1
nwKw = v(b)+￿: Substituting
the expression for Kw above, we establish (27).
We now prove that the solution satis…es (28). First, consider (26). The
numerator is positive and decreasing in nw. Denote the denominator by








Let ~ nw denote the smallest value such that D(~ nw) = 0 (by continuity of f (:)
suchavalue exists).44 Hence, in(nw;‚E) space, (26) features anasymptoteat
nw = ~ nw (see …gure 2). Since the numerator is positive, limnw"~ nw ‚E (nw) =
+1. Furthermore, (26) is monotonically increasing in (nw;‚E) space for







> 0 does not hold. Since equation (26) is identical to equation
(17) (where the relation between v0(:) and ‚E is a positive one), this implies
44If f (:) satis…es the monotone hazard rate property, ~ nw is the unique solution to
D (~ nw) = 0.
69that v0(x(n)) is increasing in n for some n > nw so that x0(n) < 0 for these
values. This contradicts themonotonicity requirement x0 (n) ¸ 0 in lemma 1.











f[tv(x(t;‚E))¡ x(t;‚E)]f (t)¡ [1¡ F (t)]v(x(t;‚E))gdt
¡
©
nw (1¡ F (nw))(v(b)+ ￿)+ bF (nw) + ¹ E
ª
:
To …nd the slope of (27) (which is `(nw;‚E) = 0) in (nw;‚E) space, we
determine `nw =
@`
@nw and `‚E =
@`
@‚E
`nw = ¡[nwv(x(nw;‚E)) ¡x(nw;‚E)]f (nw)+ [1 ¡ F (nw)]v(x(nw;‚E))
¡f[1¡ F (nw)](v(b) + ￿)¡ nwf (nw)(v(b) + ￿) + f (nw)bg
= ¡(v(xw)¡ v(b)¡ ￿)(nwf (nw)¡ [1¡ F (nw)])+ f (nw)(xw ¡ b)
= (xw ¡ b)v0(xw)D(nw) > 0; (69)
where D(nw) is de…ned in (68) and the last equality holds only for the values





























dt > 0; (70)
where we have used equation (17) to derive the third equality by eliminating
v0 (x(t;‚E)). The sign of `‚E follows because the concavity of v(x) together
with (17) imply
dx(t;‚E)
d‚E < 0. With `nw > 0 and `‚E > 0, (27) is downward
sloping in (nw;‚E) space at the point where (27) and (26) intersect.
Finally, toderive the expression for W; weemploy (14) with F (nw) agents
voluntarily unemployed





Substitution of u(nw) = v(b) + ￿ yields the expression in the proposition.
Q.E.D.
70Proof of lemma 13





> 0 if nw < ~ nw
= 0 if nw = ~ nw
< 0 if nw > ~ nw
:
The result in the lemma on
@g
@nw follows from (69), xw > b and v0(xw) > 0.







= ¡(1 ¡ F (~ nw)) < 0;
so that v0(x(~ nw)) = v0(xw) > 1
~ nw. This implies ¿ (~ nw) > 0 and thus (from
(63)) T (~ nw)+ b > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 14





















nw (1¡ F (nw))v0 (b)
+1
¹ s ¡(1¡ F (nw))
¸









where `nw and `‚E are de…ned in equations (69) and (70). The determinant














































nw(1 ¡ F (nw))v0(b)
+1
¹ s ¡ (1¡ F (nw))
¸














































































dE < 0 while x(n1) is determined by v0 (x(n1)) =
1
n1 and
thus independent of E. Hence (as u(n1) = v(x(n1) ¡ z(n1)=n1),
dz(n1)
dE > 0.





dE | {z }
>0










Since ¿ (n1) = 0, we …nd
dT(n1)
dE > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 15
Since b and ￿ appear in similar ways in equation (71), we derive results
only for b. Note that (from (17))
d‚E
dv0(xw) > 0 and (from di¤erentiating (25))
dv0(xw)















































db > 0 if `nw is close to 0 and
d‚E







0: We consider these cases in turn. First, (69) implies that `nw is close to 0
if either xw is close to b or if D (nw) is close to 0. (30) reveals that xw ¡ b is
close to 0 if ￿ is close to zero. Hence, ¹ ￿ > 0 exists such that for all ￿ 2 h0; ¹ ￿i
`nw is small enough to ensure
d‚E
db > 0. Moreover, by continuity, D(nw) is
close to 0 if nw is close to the asymptote ~ nw in …gure 2. By raising E; the
downward sloping government budget constraint in …gure 2 shifts upward so
that we can obtain an equilibrium value arbitrarily close to ~ nw. Therefore,
by choosing E su¢ciently large (but below maximum government revenues
g(~ nw;+1)), `nw is close enough to 0 so that
d‚E
db > 0.
If (26) is downward sloping around n0 (as depicted in …gure 2), a value






= 0. In this case, we
can …nd values for E such that the intersection of (27) and (26) is at nw > n
but is close enough to n so that d‚E
db < 0. More precisely, let E¤ denote the
value of E such that the intersection is at n. Then a value E¤ > E¤ exists
such that
d‚E
db < 0 for all E 2 hE¤;E¤i.
The e¤ects of b on x(n) and ¿ (n) follow immediately from
d‚E
db by using
(17) and (29), respectively.
Now we argue that
d‚E
db < 0 can be excluded if
d¿(n)
dn < 0 around nw and
if a rise in b does not lead to a Pareto improvement. More precisely, we
show that d‚E
db < 0 and
d¿(n)
dn < 0 around nw imply that raising b does yield a
Pareto improvement.


























































where we have used (25) to eliminate (v(b) +￿ ¡ v(xw)): Di¤erentiation of
v0 (xw) = 1=[nw(1 ¡ ¿(nw))] yields dnw=dxw · n2
w(1 ¡ ¿(nw))(¡v00(xw)) if
















xw¡b (1 ¡ ¿(nw)): Substitution of this
inequality in (73) to eliminate dnw







0 (b) ¡ v
0 (xw)nw(1¡ ¿(nw))(v














Substituting v0(xw) = 1=[nw(1¡¿(nw)] to eliminate v0(xw); we …nd that the
…rst term at the right-hand side of this equation is positive. Also the second
term at the right-hand side is positive if d‚E=db < 0 (since (17) implies that
dx(t)
d‚E < 0). Hence, d‚E=db < 0 together with
d¿(n)
dn < 0 around n = nw implies
that all agents gain from a higher welfare bene…t.
(74) implies that a value n¤ close to nw exists such that
du(n)
db > 0 for all
n 2 hnw;n¤i. Since
d‚E
db > 0 implies that
dx(n)





db < 0 for all n 2 hnw;n¤i. Finally, rewriting (72) for the





db | {z }
<0






db | {z }
< 0
<0
for all n 2 hnw;n¤i; where we have used that ¿ (nw) > 0 and hence ¿ (n) > 0
for n close to nw. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 16
Section 6 shows that parameter values exist under which the optimal tax
schedule implies b+T (nw) < 0 and ¿ (nw) < 0. The …rst-order condition for
nw (see (56) with u(nw) = v(b) +￿) then implies that ·w < 0.














dE | {z }
<0
> 0;
where the e¤ects of E on u(n) and x(n) are derived in lemma 14. Q.E.D.
9.5 General model
In order to facilitate the comparison of our framework with that of Saez
(2002), we consider a generalized version of our model. In particular, we
assume that u(x;y) = v(x)¡c(y); where v(x) satis…es the properties above
and c(y) is increasing and convex and satis…es c(0) = c0 (0) = 0. Further,
the search cost function ￿ (s) is increasing and convex and satis…es ￿ (0) =
￿0 (0) = 0 and lims"1￿0 (s) = +1.
74The social planner maximizes social welfare
Z n1
n0
`(n)[¡￿(s(n)) +s(n)u(n)+ (1¡ s(n))v(b)]f(n)dn;













Each agents maximizing utility with respect z yields the following …rst-order
condition
v









where ¿ (n) = ~ T0(z(n)) denotes the marginal tax ratefaced by agent n:Using
the envelope theorem, we …nd







Agents set s as follows
max
s
f¡￿ (s) + su(n) +(1 ¡ s)v(b)g;
so that the participation constraint can be written as
￿
0(s(n)) = u(n)¡ v(b):






f`(n)[¡￿(s(n)) + s(n)u(n)+ (1¡ s(n))v(b)]f(n)
¡‚z(n)(z

























¡ (1¡ s(n))b¡ E
¶
¡·(n)(￿0(s(n)) ¡ u(n)+ v(b))gdn:
The next lemma characterizes the optimal marginal tax rates. Note that
equation (76) is similar to expression (8) in Saez (2002).






































Proof. The Euler equations for u(:);z (:) and s(:) can be written as
¡‚0






































0 = ‚Ef(n)[T(n) +b] ¡ ·(n)￿
00
n(s(n)):
The transversality conditions for u(:) amount to
‚u(n0) = ‚u(n1) = 0;














For those values of n where !(n) > 0; we have ‚
0
z (n) = ‚z (n) = 0:Hence,



























Using the …rst-order condition for the individual agent for z (n) (see equation




















Table 1. Numerical results without binding participation margin
parameter values (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
n0 10¤ 4¤¤ 4¤¤ 4¤¤ 4¤¤
b 10 5 10 10 40
￿ 1 1 1 1 1
¹ E 50 120 25 50 50








nb 10 5:4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
F(nb) 0 0:0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
nz 10 4 10:5 9:4 12:3
F(nz) 0 0 0:10 0:06 0:16
¿(nb) 0 0:39 n.a. n.a. n.a.
¿(nz) 0 n.a. 0:22 0:24 0:34
¿(nmd) 0:19 0:24 0:22 0:23 0:31
¿(n95%) 0:15 0:16 0:16 0:16 0:19
max ¿(n) 0:19 0:39 0:24 0:26 0:35
x(n0) 100 10:8 67:9 51:0 65:2
z(n0) 69:1 1:8 0 0 0
u(n0) 13:1 6:1 16:5 14:3 16:2
v(b) +￿ 7:3 5:5 7:3 7:3 13:6
T(nb)=z(nb) ¡0:45 ¡5:0 ¡67:9x ¡51:0x ¡65:2x
T(nmd)=z(nmd) 0:03 0:26 ¡:06 0:04 ¡0:01
T(n95%)=z(n95%) 0:15 0:20 0:15 0:16 0:20
‚E 0:050 0:056 0:054 0:055 0:057
baseline values: ln(n) s N(3;0:5); n1 = 100 and v(x) = 2
p
x.
* The median ability nmd = 21:1; while the 95th percentile ability n95% = 46:0.
** The median ability nmd = 20:1; while the 95th percentile ability n95% = 45:6.
§ This is T(nz) since the average tax rate is not de…ned with z(nz) = 0:
77Table 2. Numerical results with binding participation margin
parameter values (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
b 40 70 40 10 0
￿ 1 1 1 10 0
¹ E 50 50 100 25 150
results
nw 11:1 20:8 17:6 15:4 4
F(nw) 0:12 0:53 0:40 0:30 0
¿(nw) 0:15 0:43 0:47 ¡0:02 0:62
T(nw)+b
z(nw) 0:15 0:43 0:47 ¡0:02 0:81
¿(nmd) 0:20 n.a. 0:40 0:08 0:23
¿(n95%) 0:16 0:21 0:19 0:13 0:16
max ¿(n) 0:21 0:43 0:47 0:13 0:62
x(nw) 88:1 139 88:1 246 2:4
z(nw) 56:9 122 90:4 231 12:3
u(nw) = v(b)+ ￿ 13:6 17:7 13:6 16:3 0
T(nw)=z(nw) ¡:55 ¡0:14 0:03 ¡0:07 0:81
T(nmd)=z(nmd) 0:04 n.a. 0:24 ¡0:03 0:32
T(n95%)=z(n95%) 0:15 0:24 0:25 0:09 0:21
‚E 0:052 0:127 0:095 0:040 0:057
baseline values: ln(n) s N(3;0:5);n0 = 4; n1 = 100;v(x) = 2
p
x and `(:) = 1;
these parameters imply nmd = 20:1, n95% = 45:6:
781
Figure 1: equilibrium in nz, λE space: 







Figure 2: equilibrium in nw, λE space: 
equations (26) and (27) in proposition 12
λE
nw
E↑
(26)
(27)
n nw
~